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Making the Most of Cooperative Federalism: What
the Clean Power Plan has Already Achieved
GABRIEL PACYNIAK*
ABSTRACT

The fate of the EPA's Clean Power Plan-the signature Obama Administration
action to reduce greenhouse gas ("GHG") emissions from existing power plants
under the Clean Air Act-is uncertain at best given pending litigation and the
opposition of PresidentDonald Trump. Despite this uncertainty,the development
of the Clean Power Plan provides an important case study of how rulemaking
under a cooperativefederalism statutory structure can prompt broad,beneficial
policy engagement by states and stakeholders, even in a contentious regulatory
action. In the development of the Clean Power Plan,active state and stakeholder
engagement and an iterativeprocess of "trying on" different compliance choices
through the rulemaking process prompted policy-learning by state officials,
spurred new interagency coordination, and developed new support for policy
insights that would not have happened in a top-down rulemaking. It also led to
the development of innovative opt-in regulatory structures that reduce interstate
coordination burdens and facilitate use of diverse state energy policies. These
insights further recent federalism scholarship, which shows that the dynamic,
iterative process of cooperativefederalism can produce public policy benefits
missed by earlier analyses. They also show how the development of the Clean
Power Plan will leave a lasting,positive contribution, regardlessof whether the
Clean PowerPlan is implemented in its currentform.
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INTRODUCTION
The future of the Clean Power Plan,1 President Barack Obama's signature
action to reduce greenhouse gas ("GHG") emissions, is uncertain at best after the
2016 Presidential election.
Promulgated under authority of the Clean Air Act ("CAA"), the Clean Power
Plan requires states to establish standards cutting carbon pollution from existing
power plants, the largest source of GHG emissions in the United States. 2 It is

1. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units,
80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) [hereinafter Clean Power Plan Final Rule].
2. See generally ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS:
1990-2015 (2017), http://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/usinventoryreport.html. In August 2016,
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projected to reduce power sector emissions by thirty-two percent from 2005
levels by 2030, 3 achieving critical progress toward the dramatic reductions in
emissions that will be necessary to address climate change. 4
President Donald Trump made repealing the Clean Power Plan a key element
of his campaign, and has moved to carry out this promise. In the March
following his inauguration-shortly before publication of this Article-President
Trump issued an executive order directing the EPA to "suspend, revise, or
rescind" the Clean Power Plan as soon as practicable if such action was
consistent with his stated policy of avoiding regulations that "unnecessarily
encumber energy production." 6 The EPA subsequently announced that it was
beginning review of the Clean Power Plan consistent with the order and that it
intended to initiate a rulemaking to suspend, revise, or rescind the rule if
appropriate once the review was concluded.7 Separately, Speaker of the House

for the first time the U.S. Energy Information Administration found that the transportation sector emissions were
higher than power sector emissions in its monthly analysis of energy data. UNITED STATES ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
AUGUST 2016 MONTHLY ENERGY REVIEW 184 85 (2016), http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/pdf/mer.
pdf.
3. Clean Power Plan Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,665.
4. In order to avoid catastrophic harms of climate change, the international community aims to "hold[] the
increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 'C above pre-industrial levels and [to] pursu[e]
efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 'C above pre-industrial levels." Paris Agreement Under the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Art. 2.1.a, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1
(Dec. 12, 2015) (final as adopted), https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop2l/eng/109rOl.pdf. According to
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change the United Nations body tasked with summarizing available
science on climate change in order to have a "likely" chance of keeping warming at less than 2 'C, the world
will need to reduce GHG emissions to nearly zero by 2100 and reduce emissions 40 70 percent by 2050 from
2010 levels. Even greater reductions will be required in the near term in order to keep warming to 1.5 'C.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE. CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP III TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 10 13 (2014), https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-reportar5/

wg3/ipcc wg3_ar5_summary-for-policymakers.pdf.
5. Press Release, Campaign of Donald J. Trump, An America First Energy Plan (May 26, 2016),
https://www.donaldjtrump.com/press-releases/an-america-first-energy-plan
(promising to rescind President
Barack Obama's Climate Action Plan as the first item of a 100 day energy action plan; the Clean Power Plan
was the centerpiece of the Climate Action Plan); Trump Vows to Scrap Clean Power Plan, UTILITY DIVE (Sept.
23, 2016), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/trump-vows-to-scrap-clean-power-plan/426905/
(vowing to
"scrap... the Clean Power Plan"). President Trump also said that he would "cancel" the Paris Agreement as
part of his energy plan, although at the time of this writing the Trump Administration is reportedly considering
staying in the Agreement. Coral Davenport, Policy Advisers Urge Trump to Keep U.S. in Paris Accord, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/18/us/politics/trump-advisers-paris-climate-accord.
html?_r=0. The 2015 Paris Agreement is a legal instrument pursuant to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change ("UNFCCC"), to which the United States is a party. The Agreement for the first
time established a framework under which all countries would curb GHG emissions with the aim of keeping
global warming below two degrees Celsius. It entered into force on November 4, 2016, and has been formally
adopted by the United States and 144 other countries. The Paris Agreement, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/paris-agreement/items/9485.php (last updated Apr. 10,
2017).
6. Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093, 16,095 (Mar. 28, 2017).
7. Review of the Clean Power Plan, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,329, 16,329 (Apr. 4, 2017).

THE

GEORGETOWN ENVTL. LAW REVIW

[Vol. 29:301

Paul Ryan called for the repeal of the rule in his 2016 policy platform, along with
repeal of all other climate change regulations. 8
In addition to these executive-branch and congressional challenges, the Clean
Power Plan is also being litigated, with states and industry lining up to both
support and challenge EPA's action in West Virginia v. EPA. 9 Opponents argue
that EPA exceeded its legal authority in promulgating the regulations and in the
approach it took to setting minimum emission limits.1 0 Many believe that the
Department of Justice presented a strong defense of the rule at oral argument in
front of an en banc panel at the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals on September 27,
2016.1 Prior to issuing a decision, however, the court granted a motion of the
EPA on April 28, 2017 to hold the litigation in abeyance as the agency reviews the
Clean Power Plan following President Trump's executive order. 12
Should the case ultimately make its way to the Supreme Court, the rule is
likely to find a tougher bench. Four of the current sitting justices, along with the
late Justice Antonin Scalia, ordered an unprecedented stay of the rule in February,
2016.13 This came after the D.C. Circuit denied14 a motion to stay and before any
lower court had ruled on the merits of the case.
President Trump subsequently appointed Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge
Neil M. Gorsuch to fill Justice Scalia's open seat. 1 5 Several environmental
organizations opposed Gorsuch's nomination, 16 and legal academics highlighted
Gorsuch's prior criticisms of deference to agencies in interpreting statutory
authority as evidence that he would likely be skeptical of environmental

8. OFFICE OF THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE PAUL RYAN, A BETTER WAY: OUR VISION FOR A CONFIDENT AMERICA:

THE ECONOMY 31 (2016), http://abetterway.speaker.gov/_assets/pdf/ABetterWay-Economy-PolicyPaper.pdf.
9. West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 23, 2015).
10. See discussion infra accompanying notes 34, 58, 98 99, 156, 188.
11. See, e.g., Rod Kuckro, Some Opponents Say EPA Looking Good After Oral Arguments, ENERGYWIRE
(Sept. 30, 2016), http://www.eenews.nedenergywire/stories/1060043673.
12. The court's order granted an abeyance for 60 days, and directed EPA to file status reports every 30 days.
Order Granting Motion to Hold Cases in Abeyance, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 28,
2017). The court further ordered that that the parties file supplemental briefs addressing whether these
consolidated cases should be remanded to the agency rather than held in abeyance.
13. West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (Feb. 9, 2016) (mem.) (Five separate but identical orders were
issued in response to five separate applications to stay).
14. Id. The Supreme Court has never before stayed an administrative regulation before it received a full
review on the merits in a lower court. Professor Lisa Heinzerling and others have questioned whether the Court
acted within its authority to stay the case. See Lisa Heinzerling, The Supreme Court's Clean-PowerPower
Grab, 28 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 425, 425 26 (2016).
15. Ed O'Keefe & Robert Barnes, Senate Confirms Neil Gorsuch to Supreme Court,WASH. POST (Apr. 7,
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpostsenate-set-to-confirm-neil-gorsuch-to-supreme-court/2017/
04/07/da3cd738-1b89-1 le7-9887- la5314b56a08_story.html?utm term =.fee546f14324.
16. Environmental organizations that urged the Senate to reject the nomination of Gorsuch include the Sierra
Club, Earthjustice, Defenders of Wildlife, and the League of Conservation Voters. See Nick Bowlin, Enviros
Slam Trump's Nominee, Turn Out to Protest, E&E DAILY (Feb. 1, 2017), www.eenews.net/eedaily/stories/
1060049329.
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regulations. 17 As a result, with Gorsuch confirmed, the rule's challengers may
have five justices sympathetic to their claims.
None of this necessarily means that the Clean Power Plan will be successfully
rescinded, weakened, or struck down. Rescinding or revising the rule would
require the agency to go through notice and comment rulemaking, and the agency
would need to show that it has "good reasons" for any change given the ample
scientific, technical, and legal record compiled to support the rule.18
With regards to litigation, the Supreme Court has previously affirmed-on
three separate occasions-that the EPA has an obligation to regulate GHGs under
the Clean Air Act. 1 9 In one of those cases, American Electric Power Co. v.
Connecticut, the Court held that federal common law nuisance claims brought
against U.S. power companies for their GHG emissions were displaced by the
EPA's then-pending rulemaking. This indicates that the Court contemplated
lawful GHG regulation of power plants under this section of the CAA.20
Congressional action to block the Clean Power Plan or revoke the EPA's
authority to regulate GHGs is also far from certain. Although a bill has been
introduced in the House of Representatives, 21 it remains to be seen whether
Congressional Republicans will make a serious effort to strip 22
EPA of its
regulatory authority-similar previous efforts have proven unpopular. If Repub-

17. Ann Carlson, Predicting How Neil Gorsuch Would Rule on Environmental Issues, LEGAL PLANET (Jan.
31, 2017), http://egal-planet.org/2017/01/31/predicting-how-neil-gorsuch-would-rule-on-environmentalissues/; Patrick Parentean, Gorsuch Likely to be Skeptical of Environmental Rules, but That Could Bite Trump,
Too, GRIST (Feb. 3, 2017), http://grist.org/politics/gorsuch-likely-to-be-skeptical-of-environmental-rules-butthat-could-bite-trump-too/.
18. In addition, if a revision rests upon factual findings that contradict those that underlay the previous
rulemaking, the agency must provide a detailed justification for the change. FCC v. Fox Television Stations,
Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 514-15 (2009); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
42 (1983). See William W. Buzbee, Opinion, Dismantling Climate Rules Isn't So Easy, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/08/opinion/dismantling-climate-rules-isnt-so-easy.html.
19. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 501 (2007) (holding EPA has an obligation to regulate GHGs from
motor vehicles under the Clean Air Act if it determines they endanger public health and welfare); Am. Elec.
Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 423 24 (holding that "the Clean Air Act and the EPA actions it
authorizes displace any federal common law right to seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from
fossil-fuel fired power plants"); Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2449 (2014) (upholding most
of EPA's regulation of GHG emissions from large new stationary sources subject to the Clean Air Act's
Prevention of Significant Deterioration ("PSD") program). In Utility Air Regulatory Group, the Supreme Court
also limited certiorari to a narrow question, effectively upholding other parts of the lower court's decision in
Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102 (D.C. Cir. 2012). In particular, the Supreme Court
declined to review parts of the D.C. Circuit decision upholding EPA's GHG endangerment finding and or its
GHG regulations for motor vehicles. Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2438.
20. Federal common law is displaced or "disappears" when Congress addresses the issue in question.
The Court pointed to EPA's then-pending regulations under Section 111 as evidence that the Clean Air Act
"speaks directly" to regulation of GHG emissions from power plants, and therefore displaces common law
claims to limit emissions from these sources. Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 424-27.
21. H.R. 637, 115th Cong. (2017) (would strip EPA of its authority to regulate GHGs and would invalidate
the Clean Power Plan).
22. See Buzbee, supra note 18.
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licans do pursue such action, it is not clear they will be able to muster the
necessary votes with only a narrow fifty-two-member majority in the Senate and
evidence of significant public support for the Clean Power Plan.23
Given the uncertainty, however, it is worth recognizing that the development
of the Clean Power Plan in-and-of-itself represents an important achievement.
This Article demonstrates how the cooperative federalism structure of Section
111(d) of the Clean Air Act, 24 when combined with unprecedented outreach by
the EPA, prompted broad policy engagement by states and stakeholders in the
rulemaking process, even among those who challenged the rule. It has resulted in
the development of important policy innovations, advanced understanding of
GHG control strategies among state officials, spurred new coordination between
state environment and energy officials, and prompted the reassessment of policy
options (such as cap-and-trade) where there had previously been strong opposition.
This account furthers recent federalism scholarship that highlights how dynamic, repeated state-federal interactions can create previously underappreciated
benefits in the regulatory process. Professors Kirsten Engel, William W. Buzbee,
Ann E. Carlson, and William Boyd, among others, have demonstrated how
iterative state-federal interaction in a shared regulatory space has led to innovation, testing, and refinement of policy proposals, horizontal and vertical dissemination of policy knowledge, and enhancement of the durability of policies.
Those states challenging the EPA's policy in court contend that broad engagement of state policymakers in the development of the federal rule-and especially the engagement of state energy officials-is evidence that the Clean Power
Plan unconstitutionally coerces or commandeers state action in violation of the
Tenth Amendment. These states claim that the rule illegally forces them to take
legislative or regulatory action to administer and facilitate a shift to a cleaner
energy system, overstepping the EPA's authority to set air pollution standards.

23. Under the Senate's current rules, Democrats can use the filibuster to prevent legislation from coming to a
vote, as 60 votes are required to bring cloture to a debate. In 2013, Democrats suspended the filibuster for
executive- and judicial-branch nominees, and there has been some speculation that Republicans might suspend
the filibuster altogether. Paul Ryan has also suggested that Republicans could achieve most of their goals
through budget reconciliation, which is not subject to the filibuster. Brad Plumer, Trump Wants to Tear up
Obama's Clean Power Plan. But PayAttention to How He Does It., Vox (Nov. 10, 2016), http://www.vox.com/
energy-and-environment2016/1 1/10/13587474/donald-trump-obama-climate-policy.
24. CAA§ 111, 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (1990).
25. E.g., Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56
EMORY L.J. 159, 182 84 (2006); David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case
Against ReallocatingEnvironmentalRegulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REv. 1796, 1809 11 (2008); William W.
Buzbee, Brownfields, Environmental Federalism,and InstitutionalDeterminism, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y REV. 1, 66-67 (1997); William W. Buzbee, ContextualEnvironmentalFederalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J.
108, 120-21 (2005); William W. Buzbee, Federalism-FacilitatedRegulatory Innovation and Regression in a
Time of Environmental Legislative Gridlock, 28 GEO. ENVTL. L. REv. 451, 456 (2016) [hereinafter Buzbee,
Legislative Gridlock]; Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 1097,
1099 1102 (2009); William Boyd & Ann E Carlson, Accidents of Federalism: Ratemaking and Policy
Innovation in Public Utility Law, 63 UCLAL. REV. 810, 881 84 (2016).
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The only obligations imposed on states by the rule, however, are requirements
that they set air pollution control standards-requirements that fall squarely
within the EPA's statutory authority. The EPA did provide states with options for
developing implementation plans that build on and align with state energy
programs-these options were developed at the request of states and based on
state input. Some states may choose to comply by implementing policies that
align their air pollution control and energy policies, but there is no federal
requirement or inducement that states do so. States are free to comply by
adopting permit-based air pollution control requirements similar to any other
Clean Air Act program, or may choose to have the EPA impose a federal plan
with such requirements. The permissibility of this basic cooperative federalism
framework has been explicitly affirmed by the Supreme Court in New York v.
United States. 26 As with any federal air pollution control program, the private
entities regulated under such programs may undertake compliance actions that
are subject to review by state public utility commissions or permitting authorities,
but these are ordinary review processes and do not represent a commandeering or
coercion of state authority under established doctrine.
Part I of this Article provides a brief background on Section 111(d) of the
Clean Air Act and the Clean Power Plan. Part II situates this Article within
scholarly discussions of environmental federalism. Part III discusses the benefits
and drawbacks of regulating greenhouse gas ("GHG") pollution from the power
sector under Section 111(d). Part IV describes how the cooperative federalism
structure of Section 111(d), when combined with the EPA's unprecedented
outreach to states, prompted an unusually broad, holistic policy response from
nearly all states and resulted in important policy innovations. Part V responds to
claims that such broad policy engagement by states that are hostile to the
regulation is evidence of unconstitutional coercion or commandeering under the
Tenth Amendment. This Article concludes by summarizing what the Clean Power
Plan has already achieved through rulemaking in a cooperative federalism
framework, regardless of whether and how the Clean Power Plan moves forward.
I.

BACKGROUND ON THE CLEAN AIR ACT SECTION

111 (d)

AND THE CLEAN

POWER PLAN

The EPA's GHG regulations under Section 111(d) follow from the U.S.
Supreme Court's Massachusetts v. EPA decision.2 7 The court held that GHGs fit
within the CANs broad definition of an air pollutant, and that as a result the EPA
would need to regulate GHGs from new motor vehicles if the agency found that
the GHG emissions endanger public health and welfare. 2 The EPA found such

26. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992).
27. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 501 (2007).
28. Id.
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endangerment in 200929 and promulgated the first GHG standards for light duty
passenger vehicles in 2010.30 These actions triggered a variety of other obligations to regulate GHGs under the CAA. 31 One of these obligations is the setting
of performance standards for categories of stationary sources that emit harmful
air pollution-including power plants and different types of industrial facilitiesunder Section 111 of the Clean Air Act.32
Section 111 of the CAA is titled the "New Source Performance Standards"
section, and, as the title suggests, it is generally concerned with the establishment
of performance standards for categories of new stationary sources of air pollution. 33 However, one provision of the section- 111(d)-charges the EPA with
regulating pollutants from categories of existing sources under certain circumstances. The EPA is required to regulate emissions of a pollutant from a category
of existing sources if, first, emissions of that pollutant are not already regulated
from the category under either the National Ambient Air Quality Standards
("NAAQS") program or the Hazardous Air Pollutant ("HAP") program, and
second, the EPA is already regulating that pollutant from the same category of
new sources under Section 111(b). 34 In effect, Section 111(d) serves as a
"catch-all" or "gap-filling" provision that requires regulation of air pollution

29. The EPA also needed to determine whether the GHG emissions from motor vehicles cause or contribute
to pollution that results in such endangerment. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for GHGs
Under Section 202(a), 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009).
30. Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy
Standards; 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010).
31. See generally the discussion of the interconnection between finding endangerment and various Clean Air
Act provisions, Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the
Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,354, 44,418 (proposed July 30, 2008).
32. The EPA has a duty to set performance standards for pollutants that may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health or welfare from categories of stationary sources already "listed" under Section 111,
although some uncertainty exists about the EPA's discretion with regards to timing. As described below, infra
text accompanying notes 38-40, states and environmental organizations filed suit in 2006 alleging that the EPA
had an obligation to set GHG standards for new power plants under this section after the EPA amended such
standards for other pollutants but declined to set standards for GHGs. New York v. EPA, No. 06-1322, 2007 U.S.
App. LEXIS 22688 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
33. Section 111 defines a new source to include sources that have undergone modifications that increase air
pollution emissions. CAA § 11 1(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(2).
34. CAA § 111 (d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (d)(1). Two amendments to the same language in Section 111 (d) were
passed into law during the process to amend the Clean Air Act in 1990. A central issue in the ongoing litigation
is whether the version first passed by the House of Representatives, which is the version that was ultimately
codified in the United States Code, prohibits regulation under Section 111(d) if the category of sources is
already regulated under Section 112 for any pollutant. Industry and state petitioners argue that because mercury
and other hazardous pollutant emissions are already regulated from power plants under Section 112, the EPA is
prohibited from regulating any pollutant from power plants under Section 111(d). The description of the
applicability of Section 111(d) to pollutants that are not regulated under other parts of the Clean Air Act
presented above is consistent with the EPA's historic interpretation of this provision. Compare Opening Brief of
Petitioners on Core Legal Issues at 61 73, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 19, 2016), with
Respondent EPA's Final Brief at 76 98, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 22, 2016). See also
Brief of the Institute for Policy Integrity at New York University School of Law as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondent at 20-31, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 1, 2016) (arguing that the EPA's
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from existing stationary sources if an air pollutant from those sources is not
already regulated under another provision of the Act. 3 5 GHGs are not currently
regulated under either the NAAQS program or as a hazardous pollutant, and
therefore meet the first requirement. As a result, if the EPA regulates GHGs from
a category of new sources under Section 111 (b), the EPA must also regulate GHG
emissions from existing sources in the same category under Section 111 (d).36
Prior to Massachusetts,37 states and NGOs had petitioned the EPA to establish
GHG performance standards for power plants and oil refineries under Section
111.38 Under the presidency of George W. Bush, the EPA denied these petitions
and the petitioners challenged the denial in New York v. EPA. 39 After the Court
handed down Massachusetts and President Barack Obama took office, the EPA
entered into a consent decree with the litigants to regulate GHG emissions from
both new and existing power plants under Section 111.40
The CAA requires the EPA to directly set performance standards for new and
modified sources under Section 111(b). 4 1 Under Section 111(d), however, the Act
prescribes a framework of cooperative federalism for the regulation of existing
sources. The EPA is charged with establishing minimum levels of emission
reduction and with creating a procedure where states submit plans to the EPA to
meet these minimum limits, "similar" to the state implementation plan process
governed by CAA Section 110.42
The statute requires that performance standards be based on the "best system
of emission reduction" ("BSER") that has been adequately demonstrated.4 3 The
EPA first identifies systems of emission reduction, and then evaluates those
systems based on criteria identified in the statute and in case law, including
whether they are adequately demonstrated, the quantity of emission reductions

interpretation of Section 111 (d) is consistent with the agency's previous interpretations under both Republican
and Democratic administrations).
35. See Clean Power Plan Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,761.
36. Clean Power Plan Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,853.
37. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
38. In 2006, states and environmental organizations petitioned the EPA to regulate GHGs under Section 111
after the EPA revised power plant performance standards for conventional pollutants but did not set standards
for GHG pollution. EPA denied the petition, and the parties appealed the decision in New York v. EPA, 2007 U.S.
App. LEXIS 22688 at *3. In 2007, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the petition back to the EPA in
light of the Supreme Court's decision in Massachusettsv. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
39. New York v. EPA, No. 06-1322, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 22688 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
40. On December 23, 2010, EPA entered into a settlement agreement with the parties that obligated the
agency to regulate GHGs from power plants and oil refineries; the agreement was amended multiple times to
delay deadlines in the agreement. Standards for oil refineries have yet to be proposed. Fossil fuel-fired power
plant settlement agreement and amendment to settlement agreement, New York v. EPA, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS
22688 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
41. CAA § 111(b)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1).
42. CAA § 111(d)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1). Section 111(d) also provides authority to establish a federal
plan if a state does not submit an adequate plan. CAA § 111(d)(2); 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(2).
43. The BSER determination is to take into account costs, environmental impact, non-air quality health, and
energy requirements. CAA § 111(a)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1).
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that would be achieved, the associated costs, the energy impacts, and the fact that

Section 111 is intended to promote new emission-reducing technologies. 44 Based
on this analysis, the EPA Administrator determines that one of the systems is the
"best" system, and she has discretion on how to weigh these different factors in
making her determination.4 5 Once the EPA identifies a "best system," the agency
then determines a numerical minimum emission limitation based on the emission
reductions that could be achieved using that same system.4 6 The EPA refers to
these minimum emission limitations, together with any additional information
47
about what is required in an approvable state plan, as "emission guidelines.,
States are then required to submit to EPA plans that establish4 standards on the
covered sources that meet these minimum emission guidelines.
Because Section 111 (d) is only triggered when regulating a pollutant that is not
already regulated under one of the other two major stationary source programs,
the provision has been used with less frequency than other parts of the Act. Since
1970, the EPA has regulated four pollutants from five source categories,4 9

44. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units,
79 Fed. Reg. 34,830, 34,879 (proposed June 18, 2014) [hereinafter Clean Power Plan Proposed Rule].
45. Id.

46. 40 C.F.R. §§ 60.20-.24.
47. The EPA "uses the term 'emissions guidelines' instead of emissions limitations to make clear that
guidelines would not be requirements directly applicable to covered sources, but instead are 'criteria for judging
the adequacy of State plans."' Clean Power Plan Proposed Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. at 34,844 n.9. The process for
developing emission guidelines was established through the EPA's promulgation of general implementing
regulations in 1975, which are cited in the preceding quotation. Standards of Performance for New Stationary
Sources; State Plans for the Control of Certain Pollutants From Existing Facilities, 40 Fed. Reg. 53,340, 53,346
(Nov. 17, 1975) [hereinafter 1975 111(d) Implementing Regulations], codifiedat40 C.ER. §§60.20 .29 (2015).
The implementing regulations have been amended on many occasions. See 44 Fed. Reg. 65,084 (Nov 9, 1979);
54 Fed. Reg. 52,028 (Dec. 20, 1989); 60 Fed. Reg. 65,240 (Dec. 19, 1995); 65 Fed. Reg. 76,384 (Dec. 6,
2000); 70 Fed. Reg. 28,606 (May 18, 2005); 71 Fed. Reg. 33,388 (June 9, 2006); 72 Fed. Reg. 59,210 (Oct. 19,
2007); 77 Fed. Reg. 9304 (Feb. 16, 2012).
48. Section 111(d) requires that the EPA permit states to "take into consideration ...the remaining useful
life" of any source to which the state is applying standards. In past rulemakings where the EPA identified an
emission limitation that must be applied to each individual source, the EPA allowed states to apply a
less-stringent standard to an individual facility if the state demonstrated that the minimum standard would result
in an unreasonable cost based on a plant's age, location, design, or other factors. 40 C.F.R. § 60.24(f). In the
Clean Power Plan, however, the EPA did not specify an emission limitation for individual facilities, but rather
identified minimum emission rates for aggregate performance of two classes of power plants. The EPA
explained that the flexibility built into this aggregate approach provides older units with additional options for
compliance and also allows states to set different standards for older units if a state chooses, meeting the
requirement that states be allowed to take into consideration the remaining useful life of individual units. Clean
Power Plan Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,870. Petitioners in West Virginia v. EPA argue that this is not sufficient
to satisfy the requirement that states be allowed to consider the remaining useful life, because states are not
allowed to weaken the aggregate emission standard for an older unit. Opening Brief of Petitioners on Core Legal
Issues at 74 78, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 19, 2016).
49. Clean Power Plan Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,703.
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including waste combustors and incinerators, landfills, and acid mist generation. 0
The EPA proposed carbon pollution standards for new power plants under
Section 111 in 2012, s 1 and subsequently proposed regulations for existing
sources under Section 111(d) in 2014-the Clean Power Plan rule.5 2 The agency
finalized both the new source and existing source rules in 2015. s 3 Both the new
source and the existing source standards are currently being litigated in the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals. Cases challenging the Clean Power Plan have been
consolidated in West Virginia v. EPA.5 4 In an unprecedented decision, on
February 9, 2016, the Supreme Court issued a stay of the Clean Power Plan,
55
supported by five justices, after the D.C. Circuit had denied a motion to stay.
Following the stay, the D.C. Circuit ordered sua sponte that the case be heard by
the en banc court instead of the previously assigned three-judge panel, and oral

50. See Phosphate Fertilizer Plants Emission Guideline, 42 Fed. Reg. 12,022 (Mar. 1, 1977); Emission
Guideline for Sulfuric Acid Mist, 42 Fed. Reg. 55,796 (Oct. 18, 1977); Emission Guidelines for Kraft Pulp
Mills, 44 Fed. Reg. 29,828 (May 22, 1979); Emission Guidelines for Primary Aluminum Plants, 45 Fed. Reg.
26,294 (Apr. 17, 1980); Emission Guidelines for Municipal Waste Combustors 60 Fed. Reg. 65,387 (Dec. 19,
1995); Emission Guidelines for Municipal Solid Waste Landfills, 61 Fed. Reg. 9905 (Mar. 12, 1996); Emission
Guidelines for Hospital/Medical/Infectious Waste Incinerators, 62 Fed. Reg. 48,348 (Sept. 15, 1997); Emission
Guidelines for Commercial and Industrial Solid Waste Incineration Units, 65 Fed. Reg. 75,338 (Dec. 1, 2000);
Emission Guidelines for Existing Small Municipal Waste Combustion Units, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,378 (Dec 6,
2000); Emission Guidelines for Other Solid Waste Incineration Units, 70 Fed. Reg. 74,870 (Dec. 16, 2005);
Emission Guidelines for Sewage Sludge Incineration Units, 76 Fed. Reg. 15,372 (Mar 21, 2011); Emission for
Municipal Solid Waste Landfills, 81 Fed. Reg. 59,276 (Aug. 29, 2016). In addition, in 2005 the EPA attempted
to delist mercury as a hazardous air pollutant under CAA Sec. 112 and instead proposed to regulate mercury
from new and existing power plants under Section 111 in the Clean Air Mercury Rule. Clean Air Mercury Rule,
70 Fed. Reg. 28,606 (May 18, 2005). The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that the delisting of Mercury from
Section 111(d) was illegal and vacated the rule on those grounds. New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574 (D.C. Cir.
2008), cert. denied sub nom. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. New Jersey, 555 U.S. 1169 (2009).
51. For both new source and existing source standards, EPA proposed to regulate only carbon dioxide, the
primary greenhouse gas emitted by power plants. Standards of Performance for GHG Emissions for New
Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 22,392 (proposed Apr. 13, 2012). The EPA
withdrew this proposal in September 2013 and issued a revised proposal at the same time. Withdrawal of
Standards of Performance for GHG Emissions From New Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units,
79 Fed. Reg. 1352 (Jan. 8, 2014); Standards of Performance for GHG Emissions From New Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 1430 (re-proposed Jan. 8, 2014). In June 2014, EPA also
proposed GHG standards for modified and reconstructed power plants under its Section 111(b) authority.
Carbon Pollution Standards for Modified and Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating
Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,960 (proposed June 18, 2014).
52. Clean Power Plan Proposed Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. at 34,830.
53. Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From New, Modified, and Reconstructed
Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,510 (Oct. 23, 2015).
54. North Dakota v. EPA, No. 15-1381 (D.C. Cir. filed Oct. 23, 2015) (consolidated cases challenging new
source carbon pollution standards); West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 23, 2015) (consolidated
cases challenging the Clean Power Plan).
55. See, e.g., West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (Feb. 9, 2016) (mem.) (Five separate but identical orders
were issued in response to five separate applications to stay). The Supreme Court had never previously stayed an
administrative regulation before it received a full review on the merits in a lower court. Many have questioned
whether the Court acted within its authority to stay the case. See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, The Supreme Court's
Clean-PowerPower Grab, 28 GEO. ENVTL. L. REv. 425 (2016).
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argument was held on September 27, 2016.56 After President Trump's executive
order directing EPA to suspend, revise, or rescind the Clean Power Plan if
appropriate, the Department of Justice moved to hold litigation in abeyance until
after the completion of the review and any resulting regulatory action. On April
28, 2017, the court granted the motion, holding the litigation in abeyance for sixty
days, and further ordering briefing on whether the case should be remanded to the
agency rather then held in abeyance.5 8 Addressing the core issues in the litigation
is beyond the scope of this Article, although Section V discusses claims that the
Clean Power Plan's implementation of a cooperative federalism structure illegally commandeers or coerces states.
II.

BENEFITS OF "DYNAMIC"

STATE-FEDERAL INTERACTION

A vast amount of federalism scholarship has been generated since the passage
of the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act in the early 1970s, as these two
statutes reinvigorated the role of federalism in U.S. environmental law. Much of
this scholarship has focused on understanding whether and under what circumstances cooperative federalism regulatory approaches provide public policy
benefits. As summarized in Part A below, the first and second generations of
federalism scholarship often approached this question by exploring which level
of government was optimal for addressing a specific regulatory problem. Scholars in this vein assessed whether a given level of government was well suited to
address an issue based on criteria such as efficiency, regulatory effectiveness, and

political accountability.
More recently, however, a number of scholars have critiqued such analyses,
arguing that these earlier authors overlooked important benefits of federalism
because of their reliance on static structural analyses that did not take into
account benefits resulting from the ongoing, iterative nature of state-federal
interactions. Part B of this section summarizes insights from this newer school of
federalism. These include arguments that, over time, state-federal interactions
can result in important policy innovations and refinements as well as enhanced
learning among policymakers. They can also lay the groundwork for future
regulatory efforts that may not be politically feasible at the present time. This
Article builds on and advances insights from this "dynamic" school of federalism, showing how a single rulemaking that promotes intensive state-federal
interaction can provide many of these same benefits.

56. Per Curiam Order, En Banc, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. May 16, 2016).

57. Respondent Notice of Executive Order, EPA Review of Clean Power Plan and Forthcoming Rulemaking,
and Motion to Hold Cases in Abeyance, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 28, 2017).

58. Order Granting Motion to Hold Cases in Abeyance, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Apr.
28, 2017).
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A.

DUAL FEDERALISM AND THE MATCHING PRINCIPLE

Between the late nineteenth century and 1937, the courts interpreted the
constitutional arrangement between the federal government and states as one of
"dual federalism," where the federal and state governments had separate, independent spheres of authority.5 9 Courts were intent on ensuring that the federal
government did not overstep its constitutional powers into the zone of activities
reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment. 60 The courts' commitment to
checking federal incursions into the states' zone of activities waned at the same
time as federal power expanded under the New Deal. After 1937, the courts did
not strike down any federal laws on the grounds of violating the Tenth Amendment until New York v. United States in

1992.61

The passage of the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act in the 1970s
reinvigorated interest in the relationship between federal and state jurisdictions.
Both statutes rely on cooperative federalism frameworks, where the EPA sets
minimum pollution limits and states are tasked with implementation and enforcement of standards.
Prior to the passage of these laws, states had primary responsibility for
environmental regulations as part of their broad police power, which included the
power to regulate public health and safety. 62 Congress passed the Clean Air Act
because of concerns that states were not taking sufficient action to address air
pollution.63 During the passage of the bill, legislators pointed to the magnitude of
the regulatory task as a key reason for allowing state implementation and

59. Erwin Chemerinsky, Federalism Not as Limits, But as Empowerment, 45 U. KAN. L. REv. 1219, 1224

(1996).
60. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. The U.S. Constitution limits federal
authority to the powers granted to it by the Constitution itself, and the Supremacy Clause provides that federal
laws made pursuant to that authority are supreme over any state laws. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. ("This
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof... shall be the
supreme Law of the Land.").
61. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
62. See Hillsborough Cty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715 16 (1985) (citing Jones v. Rath
Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)) (noting that for a field preemption challenge to state laws, challengers
must overcome a presumption that state and local health and safety regulations under states' historic police
powers were not to be superseded without a clean and manifest expression by Congress).
63. See, e.g., 116 CONG. REc. 32,901 (1970) (comments of Sen. Muskie) ("However, State and local
governments have not responded adequately to this challenge. It is clear that enforcement must be toughened if
we are to meet the national deadlines. More tools are needed, and the Federal presence and backup authority
must be increased."); Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State
Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1197 (1977) (citing 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1857c-4, -5 (1970 & Supp. V. 1975) ("The failure of prior efforts (heavily dependent on state initiatives) to
check air pollution prompted Congress to enact the 1970 Clean Air Amendments[.])").
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enforcement, which they feared would swamp federal resources.64 Scholars have
also argued that by creating a prominent role for states, Congress was shifting
blame for a politically sensitive issue to the states,65 or was seeking to protect
against a race-to-the-bottom by states competing to attract industry with more lax
standards.66
As the Clean Air and Water Acts were implemented, they gave rise to extensive
scholarly literature focused on rationales for implementing regulations at different levels of government. Advocates for providing an increased role to states
contended that state and local governments are better situated to evaluate land use
(which often plays a major role in responding to pollution),6 7 local air pollution
impacts and costs, 68 and local energy requirements. Scholars have also argued
that devolution allows for more direct public participation and therefore promotes democratic values or civic republicanism. 69 Another widely explored
rationale is that devolution allows states to act, in Justice Brandeis' words, as
"laboratories of democracy," which advance innovations through variation in
70
policy.

64. John P. Dwyer, The Practiceof Federalism under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REv. 1183, 1192 (1995)
("These members of Congress were concerned with the practical difficulties that would arise from implementing, enforcing, and funding the vast and complicated Clean Air Act.").
65. "Conceivably, by delegating implementation and enforcement to the states, Congress was also shifting
politically sensitive issues to state officials." Id.; see also Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local
Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism,76
VA. L. REv. 265, 275 76 (1990) (describing one rationale for congressional devolution to states is to shift blame
for controversial legislation).
66. Richard Revesz points to legislative history showing that both the National Ambient Air Quality
Standards and New Source Performance Standards were justified on race to the bottom grounds, e.g. "The
promulgation of Federal emission standards for new sources.., will preclude efforts on the part of States to
compete with each other in trying to attract new plants and facilities without assuring adequate control of
extra-hazardous or large-scale emissions therefrom." Richard L. Revesz, RehabilitatingInterstate Competition:
Rethinking the Race-to-the-Bottom Rationalefor Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1210,
1226 1229 (1992) (citing H.R. REP. No. 1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970)). Revesz's article, which sparked a
broad debate, argued that with few exceptions, federal Clean Air Act standards don't necessarily protect against
interstate externalities, but by setting federal minimums, do protect against race-to-the bottom concerns. He
contends, however, that while competition among states may lead to less environmental protection, it would be
at a level that was socially optimal, and that therefore there should be a presumption in favor of decentralization.
Id.
67. Stewart, supra note 63, at 1196 (describing how the federal government is dependent on state and local
authorities to implement many federal pollution laws in part because of "the close interrelation between
environmental controls and local land use decisions").
68. See, e.g., James E. Krier, The IrrationalNationalAir Quality Standards:Macro- and Micro-Mistakes,22
UCLA L. REv. 323, 329 (1974), arguing that state and local governments will have varying health impacts and
costs of abatement from region to region, and that therefore uniform standards are not efficient.
69. See Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism,91 JOWA L. REv. 243, 270 72 (2005)
(describing arguments that federalism may promote the civic republican tradition).
70. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It is one of the
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
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In contrast, proponents of centralization highlighted the ability of the federal
government to solve the tragedy-of-the-commons problem, or relatedly, to avoid
interstate spillover effects between one state and another that reduce incentives
for states to regulate.7 1 Public choice theorists have argued that the political
processes at the state level undervalue environmental benefits, because environmental groups are better able to affect policy at the national level. 72 Regulation at
the federal level can also provide greater regulatory uniformity, a benefit for
interstate commerce, and provide economies of scale.7 3
One of the dominant analytical paradigms that emerged from this period of
scholarship was the "matching principle," the idea that there could be a best fit
between environmental problems and regulatory responses. In one articulation of
this principle, optimal regulations would match the geographic scale of the
pollution with an appropriate level of jurisdiction-pollutants with local reach
would best be regulated by local governments.7 4 In another conception, the
market failure that was causing the environmental problem would be aligned
with the level of jurisdiction best suited to address it. For example, an interstate
tragedy-of-the-commons problem would match with a national regulatory
response.75
B.

DYNAMIC, ITERATIVE FEDERALISM

In recent years, a number of scholars have challenged analyses that promise to
identify an "optimal" level of regulation for a specific environmental problem.
Authors from this newer school of scholarship argue that these optimization
analyses overlook important benefits because of their reliance on static, structural
analyses that do not take into account the dynamic, iterative nature of statefederal interactions. This newer wave of scholars typically uses empirical,
descriptive accounts of state-federal interactions over time and across jurisdictions to portray a more dynamic, iterative regulatory relationship. Their accounts
contend that the jurisdictional overlap dismissed as inefficient or sub-optimal by
earlier scholars may in fact provide underappreciated public policy benefits.
Proponents of "dynamic federalism" frequently use climate change policy
responses as a case study, in part because the history of U.S. climate action belies

71. When the benefits of pollution control accrue to downwind states, these interstate externalities reduce the
incentive for upwind states to regulate. Carlson, supra note 25, at 1104 ("The most compelling and obvious case

for federal regulation is in the presence of interstate externalities: states lack the incentive to regulate more
stringently to reduce pollution that enters other states, making federal regulation necessary to correct this market
failure."); Revesz, supra note 66, at 1222 23. See generally Stewart, supra note 63, identifying rationales for

and against centralizing authority for controlling pollution.
72. Stewart, supra note 63, at 1213 15.
73. Id. at 1212.
74. Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: The Case for
Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. & PoCY REV. 23, 23 27 (1996).
75. Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REv. 570, 626 (1996).
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the matching principle narrative. GHGs are global pollutants, and as such they
pose collective action and spillover problems for decentralized regulators. Why
would a state seek to regulate GHGs when other states are not taking action,
given the global nature of the problem? From a matching standpoint, the optimal
level of government for regulation would be at the international or national level.
Yet in the United States, states have consistently been leaders on climate
change and on clean energy, and in doing so have developed models of regulation
that have since been adapted into federal policies.76 This state leadership has
included the widespread adoption of state renewable energy and energy efficiency mandates beginning in the 1990s, with a majority of states having both
renewable and energy efficiency standards on the books today. It also includes the
development and implementation of GHG vehicle standards by California and
nearly a dozen other states, laying the foundation for federal GHG vehicle
standards that have now been adopted. A final example is the development and
adoption of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative ("RGGI") cap-and-trade
program for power plants by nine northeast and mid-Atlantic states, as well as
California's subsequent cap-and-trade program. 77
Conventional rationales for why these states have acted as leaders include that
state leaders are responding to political preferences of their electorates and, 78 in
an inverse of the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis, that competition among states
for economic development drives state behavior.7 9 Scholars from the dynamic
federalism school add to this an account of a more nuanced relationship between
state and federal actors. Ann Carlson describes how key state climate policy
innovations "are the results of repeated, sustained, and dynamic lawmaking
efforts involving both levels of government." 0 Using the development of the
California GHG standards for cars and RGGI as case studies, she describes how
these innovations resulted from unique federal engagement of the relevant states
that initiated iterative regulatory processes.8 1 Similarly, Kirsten Engel highlights
how state regulation may be a valuable stepping-stone to federal regulation, and
has emphasized the way in which the quality of regulatory policies can improve

76. Adelman & Engel, supra note 25, at 1846-49.
77. See generally Vicki Arroyo et al., State Innovation on Climate Change: Reducing Emissions from Key
Sectors While Preparing for a "New Normal", 10 HARV. L. & PocY REV. 385, 387 (2016).
78. See JR. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The Case of Climate
Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1499, 1516 21 (2007); Kirsten H. Engel & Scott R. Saleska, Subglobal Regulation
of the Global Commons: The Case of Climate Change, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 183, 190 94 (2005).
79. Barry G. Rabe et al., State Competition as a Source Driving Climate Change Mitigation, 14 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 1, 12-43 (2005).
80. Carlson, supra note 25, at 1099.
81. Id. The two examples provided by Carlson are the development of California's car standards under
California's unique Clean Air Act (authority to implement air pollution standards for motor vehicles that are
more stringent than federal standards), and the way that RGGI arose from the federally-created Ozone Transport
Commission. Id.
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2
through a dynamic interaction between federal and state policies.
Among the features noted by dynamic federalism scholars is the way in which
the interplay between and among federal and state or local partners creates an
opportunity for innovation. This is one of the themes explored by William
Buzbee in a series of articles demonstrating how dynamic federal-state interactions can lead to both "horizontal (state-to-state) and vertical (federal and state)
learning and influence., 8 3 Buzbee also emphasizes the importance of the context
of regulatory action, including how the actions of federal, state, and other actors4
8
change over time and respond to each within a specific regulatory modality.
Several scholars from this school argue that the benefits identified through these
types of studies more broadly support the choice of non-preemptive or concurrent
federalism regimes in federal policymaking. 5 Many of these dynamic federalism
accounts describe developments that span significant time periods as case studies.
They also often focus on the "leading" states that are the policy innovators.
In this Article, I seek to show how even in a single rulemaking, the key
characteristics of dynamic cooperative federalism-overlapping jurisdiction,
intensive state-federal engagement, and policy iteration-can go a long way to
solving difficult public policy problems and can promote learning among
participants. This Article also shows how intensive state-federal engagement
through the rulemaking process can prompt a holistic policy response from a
broad group of states-not just from the "usual suspects"-including from states
that are strongly critical of the regulatory enterprise. Finally, although much has
been written about whether and how federalism facilitates state innovation, less
has been written about how states and the federal government use federalism
strategically under the Clean Air Act to address public policy challenges that
neither states nor the federal government could easily address on their own, at
least under the current framework of the Clean Air Act.

82. Engel, supra note 25, at 170 73, 77.
83. Buzbee, Legislative Gridlock, supra note 25, at 456.
84. Buzbee, Contextual EnvironmentalFederalism,supra note 25, at 113.
85. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling
Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1547 (2007) (assessing benefits of different types of preemptive regimes and
arguing that floor preemption provides unique innovation and policy development benefits); David E. Adelman
& Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Environmental Federalism, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND

REALITY OF FEDERALISM'S CORE QUESTION 277 (William W. Buzbee ed., 2009) (arguing that preemption
premised on static optimization increases risks of freezing policies in dead ends and is less responsive to
changing environmental and social conditions); THOMAS 0. MCGARITY, THE PREEMPTION WAR: WHEN FEDERAL

BUREAUCRACIES TRUMP LOCAL JURIES (2008) (arguing that in many cases preemption of common law claims has
served to limit corrective justice opportunities for victims of defective products, negligent activities, and
fraudulent business practices).
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GHG

EMISSIONS FROM

THE ELECTRIC POWER SECTOR

Section 111(d) has certain characteristics that are well-suited for regulating
GHG emissions from the electric power sector. Its key beneficial trait is
flexibility-flexibility in how EPA sets emission guidelines and flexibility in the
compliance approaches that states can use to establish standards in state plans.
These flexibilities are important in the context of regulating GHGs because the
most cost-effective strategies for reducing emissions from the power sector
include grid-scale strategies that could not be employed under more restrictive
statutes. At the same time, Section 111(d) mandates a state-by-state approach to
regulating GHGs, which has significant drawbacks for regulating these global
pollutants from an interstate electricity system.
A.

STRATEGIES TO REDUCE GHG EMISSIONS FROM THE POWER SECTOR

As a threshold matter, the strategies used to reduce GHG emissions from
electricity generation are currently more limited than those used to control
conventional pollutants. Carbon dioxide-the prime GHG pollutant emitted by
power plants-is emitted in much larger quantities than conventional pollutants
such as nitrogen dioxide, sulfur dioxide, or particulate matter, or hazardous
pollutants like mercury. Because of the volume of emissions, and because it is
relatively unreactive, carbon dioxide cannot be removed or "scrubbed" from
power plant emissions by end-of-stack controls.8 6 Instead, the strategies used to
reduce carbon pollution emissions include improving the efficiency of the power
plants themselves, shifting electricity generation to cleaner power plants, reducing the demand for electricity, or capturing and sequestering the carbon emitted in
underground storage.87 These strategies are not unique to controlling GHG
pollution-indeed they have been relied upon by the EPA in regulatory actions to
control mercury and nitrous oxides, among other pollutants 88-but they are
central to the control of GHGs because end-of-stack controls are not available.
With the exception of carbon capture and sequestration, these strategies are
already being widely implemented because of a combination of market factors
and state and federal policies. The abundance of cheap natural gas from the
hydraulic fracturing boom has driven a dramatic shift from carbon-intensive

86. Clean Power Plan Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,690.
87. Id. at 64,689. For a thorough survey of strategies that may be used to reduce GHG emissions from the
power sector that generally fall within these broad categories, see NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CLEAN AIR
AGENCIES, IMPLEMENTING EPA's CLEAN POWER PLAN: A MENU OF OPTIONS (2015), http://www.4cleanair.orgl
NACAA Menu ofOptions.
88. See, e.g., Final Brief of the Institute for Policy Integrity at New York University School of Law as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 6 18, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 1, 2016)
(providing examples of previous Clean Air Act regulations relying on generation shifting, trading, and third
party actions).
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coal-fired generation to natural gas-fired electricity generation, which is significantly less carbon-intensive. 89 A combination of federal tax credits, state policies,
and decreasing technology costs have similarly driven dramatic increases in
renewable energy and improvements in demand-side energy efficiency. 90 Finally,
many older, inefficient coal plants are retiring, in part because of new federal
mercury control requirements and other non-GHG regulations. 91 As a result,
carbon pollution emissions in the power sector declined twenty-one percent
between 2005 and 2015.92 While not nearly sufficient to meet the level of
reductions required to address climate change, this trend demonstrates that these
strategies are being successfully used to reduce carbon emissions from the power
sector.
Many of these strategies represent changes that occur in electricity generation
at the level of the grid, not on the level of an individual power plant. Shifts in
generation from coal-fired power plants to more efficient natural gas power
plants or renewable energy generation will result in overall reductions in
emissions from all of the fossil-fuel fired power plants on the grid. However, such
shifts will not necessarily result in absolute reductions of emissions or improvements in emission intensity from each individual power plant. In order to employ
these strategies, a regulatory mechanism is therefore required that allows for
measuring improvements on an aggregate or average basis.
Such strategies also benefit from the use of compliance mechanisms that
facilitate aggregation or averaging across multiple units, such as trading or
crediting mechanisms. Trading or crediting can create a market for emissionreducing actions and facilitate transactions between parties that can costeffectively reduce emissions further and those that are seeking to contract for
cost-effective reductions.9 3
In the context of conventional pollutants that have harmful local impacts, an
important drawback of averaging, crediting, or trading is that it does not require
reductions from each individual source. Even if emissions are reduced among the
group of units, these compliance flexibilities could allow emissions to stay the
same or even increase at a particular source of pollution. This is of particular
concern when market based-policies maintain or exacerbate discriminatory
pollution patterns. This risk does not apply directly to GHG pollution because

89. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2016, at ES-3 (2016), http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/

aeo/pdf/0383 (2016).pdf.
90. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, 2015 RENEWABLE ENERGY DATA BOOK 27, 48 (2015), http://www.nrel.gov/

doc s/fy 17osti/66591 .pdf.
91. Coal Made Up More Than 80% of Retired Electricity Generating Capacity in 2015, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN. (Mar. 8, 2016), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id-25272.
92. See Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Electricity Generation in 2015 Were Lowest Since 1993, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (May 13, 2016), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id-26232.
93. CENTER FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS, CLIMATE CHANGE 101: CAP AND TRADE 9, 11 (2011),
https://www.c2es.org/docUploads/climate 101-captrade.pdf.
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GHGs are a global pollutant that does not cause local harms. However, marketbased policies implemented as GHG pollution regulations may have the potential
to affect conventional pollutants without appropriate protections.
B. BENEFICIAL FLEXIBILITY OF SECTION

111(d)

An important characteristic of Section 111 (d) is that it provides broad flexibility to the EPA in setting the emission guidelines, and similarly provides broad
discretion to states in how they implement standards of performance in state
plans in response to the guidelines. The EPA has used this flexibility to base the
"best system of emission reduction" on the cost-effective emission reduction
strategies described above, and also to allow states to use these strategies for
compliance in their state plans.
1. Flexibility in Setting Emission Guidelines
The language of CAA Section 111 (a)(1) charges the EPA Administrator with
determining the best system of emission reduction on which the standards will be
based, and includes a broad list of factors that EPA must consider, including cost,
environmental impacts, non-air health benefits, and energy requirements. 94 In
several cases, courts have affirmed that this language provides the EPA with
significant discretion in how it determines what constitutes a95"best" system on the
basis of these factors, most notably in Sierra Club v. Costle.

94. "The term 'standard of performance' means a standard for emissions of air pollutants which reflects the
degree of emission limitation achievable through the application of the best system of emission reduction which
(taking into account the cost of achieving such reduction and any nonair quality health and environmental
impact and energy requirements) the Administrator determines has been adequately demonstrated." CAA
§ 111(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1).
95. In Sierra Club, the court held that "The text gives EPA broad discretion to weigh different factors in
setting the standard" and that if Congress had meant to "curtail EPA's discretion to weigh various policy
considerations it would have explicitly said so in section 111, as it did in other parts of the statute." 657 F.2d 298,
321, 330 (D.C. Cir. 1981). See also Lignite Energy Council v. EPA, 198 F.3d 930, 934 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (finding
that EPA has "considerable" discretion in setting the standard). Courts have often found that agencies are
permitted and in some circumstances compelled to consider other logically relevant factors in agency action
that are not explicitly listed in the relevant statutory provision, as long as those factors are not explicitly or
implicitly prohibited by the statute. See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Factors Can an Agency Consider
in Making a Decision?, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REv. 67 (2009). Much of the courts' recent attention in this arena has
been focused on whether the EPA may consider costs in regulatory actions where, unlike in Section 111 (d), costs
are not explicitly listed as a factor in the relevant statutory provision. Recently, the Supreme Court found in
Michigan v. EPA that the EPA must consider costs when deciding whether it is "appropriate and necessary" to
regulate power plants under Clean Air Act Section 112, as costs are one of the relevant factors that an agency
would need to consider in reasoned decisionmaking in this context. 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706-08 (2015). In two
other recent cases EPA v. EME Homer City Generationand Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper the Supreme Court
held that the EPA could consider costs in particular circumstances where the relevant statutory provision left a
gap or was ambiguous. EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1602-09 (2014) (finding that
consideration of costs in combination with other factors was a reasonable way of filling the "gap" left open by
Congress in the CAA's good neighbor provision, which requires states to control interstate pollution that affects
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Under this framework, the EPA determined that the "best system of emission
reduction" was a combination of strategies that included shifting electricity
generation from existing coal-fired power plants to existing natural gas-fired
power plants and to new renewable generation. 96 Once the EPA determined that
BSER was based in part on these strategies to shift electricity generation to
cleaner sources, then the EPA was required to set the minimum emission
limitation at a level that reflected the substantial GHG emission reductions that
could be achieved by these strategies.9 7
Petitioners in the ongoing litigation have argued that such "generation shifting" is an impermissibly broad interpretation of the EPA's discretion.98 This issue
has been discussed widely elsewhere 99 and a more thorough discussion is beyond
the scope of this Article.
2. Flexibility for States in Developing State Plans
Section 111(d) also provides states with flexibility in how to meet the
minimum emission limits through their state plans. The statute directs the EPA to
create a process patterned after the cooperative federalism model of CAA Section

other states meeting of standards); Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 218 19 (2009) (finding that
an ambiguous Clean Water Act provision permitted considerations of benefits and costs). In contrast to these
cases, however, the Supreme Court held in Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. that the EPA could not
consider costs in the setting of National Ambient Air Quality Standards. 531 U.S. 457, 466-68 (2001) (holding
that because the Clean Air Act so often explicitly directed consideration of costs in controlling air pollution, the
Court refused to find such authorization "implicit in ambiguous sections of the CAA"). See also Daniel A.
Farber, Taking Costs into Account: Mapping the Boundaries of Judicial and Agency Discretion, 40 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 87 (2016).
96. The EPA first proposed that the best system of emission reduction be composed of four building blocks:
(1) improvements in the efficiency of individual power plants; (2) reducing emissions from existing coal, oil, or
gas power plants by shifting generation to more efficient existing combined-cycle natural gas power plants; (3)
reducing emissions from all cover power plants by shifting generation to renewable energy and other
zero-emitting generation; and (4) reducing emissions by reducing demand through energy-efficiency programs.
Clean Power Plan Proposed Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. at 34,856. In the final rule, the EPA finalized a best system of
emission reduction that was largely similar, but eliminated the fourth building block, energy efficiency. Clean
Power Plan Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,707.
97. The EPA considered other options for BSER that would have not included generation shifting, but found
that those options either did not achieve sufficient emission reductions (i.e., limiting BSER to on-site energy
efficiency) or found that these strategies were too costly in comparison (i.e., carbon capture and sequestration).
98. Compare Opening Brief of Petitioners on Core Legal Issues at 61 73, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363
(D.C. Cir. Feb. 19, 2016), with Respondent EPA's Final Brief at 27-40, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C.
Cir. Apr. 22, 2016).
99. See, e.g., GREGORY E. WANNIER ET AL., PREVAILING ACADEMIC VIEW ON COMPLIANCE FLEXIBILITY UNDER
§ 111 OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT (2011), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract-1978479; JEREMY M. TARR ET AL.,
NICHOLAS INST. FOR ENVTL. POLICY SOLS., REGULATING CARBON DIOXIDE UNDER SECTION

111(D)

OF THE CLEAN

AIR ACT: OPTIONS, LIMITS, AND IMPACTS (2013), https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/climate/policydesign/regulatingcarbon-dioxide-under-section-1 Id;

Tomas Carbonell, EPA's Proposed Clean Power Plan: Protecting Climate

and Public Health by Reducing Carbon Pollutionfrom the U.S. Power Sector, 33 YALE L. & POL' Y REV. 403
(2015); Nathan Richardson, Trading Unmoored: The UncertainLegal FoundationforEmissions Trading Under
§ 111 of the CleanAirAct, 120 PENN ST. L. REV. 181 (2015).
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110, where the EPA sets the standard and states have control over the way in
which they meet the standard. Section 110 also explicitly allows states to use
emissions trading and other market-based mechanisms. Although there is some
uncertainty as to how similar Section 111(d) must be to Section 110 due to the
vagueness of the statute and the lack of case law, the EPA has interpreted Section
111(d) to provide states with similarly broad control over the manner of
compliance as long as state plans meet environmental goals.
As is typical of Section 111(d), the statutory language is short and broad. The
key element is that it requires the EPA to develop a "procedure ...similar" to the
procedure used in Section 110, which governs the development and approval of
state implementation plans ("SIPs") to meet the NAAQS.1 ° ° Section 111(d)
specifies that state plans are to "establish standards of performance" for "any
existing source" that is subject to the regulatory action. 1O1
In contrast to the broad and general language of Section 111 (d), Section 110
provides significant detail about the types of strategies that states may use to meet
the relevant standards, the elements to be included in a state implementation plan,
and the procedure for submitting and approving plans. 102 A central feature of
Section 110 is that states develop the content of their SIPs to meet the federal
standard, with each state having "the primary responsibility for assuring air
quality" and to3 "specify the manner in which ...standards will be achieved and
10
maintained."
Section 110 has been the subject of extensive litigation, and as a result, case
law has clarified the respective responsibilities of the EPA and states under this
section. U.S. courts have consistently interpreted Section 110 to require that the
EPA allow states significant discretion in how they develop state plans as long as
they meet the environmental goals. This line of cases begins with the Supreme
Court's 1975 decision in Train v. NaturalResources Defense Council,Inc., which

held that "so long as the ultimate effect of a State's choice of emission limitations
is compliance with the... standards.., the State is at liberty to adopt whatever
' 10 4
mix of emission limitations it deems best suited to its particular situation."
This division of authority has been reaffirmed in the SIP context after both the
1977 and 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act, most notably by the D.C.
Circuit's 1997 decision in Virginia v. EPA. 10 5 In addition to affirming that the

100. CAA § 111(d); 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d).
101. Id.
102. See CAA § 110(a)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1).
103. CAA § 107(a); 42 U.S.C. § 7407(a).
104. Train v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 421 U.S. 60,79 (1975); see also Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246,
249 (1976) (holding that Section 110 left to the states "the power to determine which sources would be burdened
by regulation and to what extent.").
105. Virginia v. EPA, 108 F.3d 1397 (D.C. Cir. 1997), modified on other grounds, 116 F.3d 499 (D.C. Cir.
1997). The doctrine holding that the EPA may not unduly restrict state choices has been referred to as the
"federalism bar." Most recently, the federalism bar was relied on by the D.C. Circuit to strike down the EPA's
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division of responsibilities articulated in Train still applied after 1990, the D.C.
Circuit held in Virginia that the EPA could not require a state to adopt a particular
control measure by providing only one viable compliance option. 106 As the D.C.
Circuit subsequently put it in Michigan v. EPA, a permissible federal regulation
must set an "end goal," not dictate "source-specific means," and must also allow
the states "real choice with regard to the control measure options available to
7
' 10

them."

Section 110 explicitly allows states to use a broad range of strategies as
mechanisms for compliance. In the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act,
Congress amended the text of Section 110 to explicitly allow states to include in
their state implementation plans "other control measures, means, or techniques ... including economic incentives such as fees, marketable permits, and
auctions of emissions rights."10 8
Although Section 110 provides substantial flexibility to states in how they
meet the standards, it does not provide states with a "carte-blanche" to submit
whatever plan they like. States are subject to legal constraints established by
Section 110 or by other applicable statutory provisions.10 9 The EPA has significant discretion in interpreting the legal constraints in its approval or disapproval
of SIPs, 110 and this discretion is particularly emphasized in the context of

Cross State Air Pollution Rule, on the grounds that the EPA did not provide the states with sufficient time to
develop their own implementation plans to meet the EPA's emission budgets under the Clean Air Interstate Rule.
EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, 696 F.3d 7, 37 (D.C. Cir. 2012). The Supreme Court overruled the D.C.
Circuit, but did not undermine this federalism bar. EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, 134 S. Ct. 1584,
1600 02 (2014).
106. In the action at issue, EPA required northeast states to modify their state implementation plans, and only
permitted them to either adopt California's vehicle emission program or to adopt their own mix of programs in a
"substitute program" that would be required to achieve reductions 3.5 to 6.5 times greater than what the
California program would achieve. The D.C. Circuit found that this substitute program was not a "real
alternative" and that in practice the EPA action would impermissibly require the states to adopt the California
program. Virginia, 108 E3d at 1404 10.
107. Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 687 (D.C. Cir. 2000). EPA assigned nitrous oxide (NOx) emission
budgets to northeastern states in order to address cross-state pollution leading to regional ground-level ozone
non-attainment, and required states to limit NOx emissions to these budgets in their SIPs under Section 110's
"good neighbor" provision. The budgets were based on reductions that could be achieved through use of "highly
cost-effective" measures, but allowed states to choose from a "myriad" of strategies beyond these measures.
Several states challenged the budgets as impermissibly intruding on the right of states to fashion their SIP
submissions in the first instance. The D.C. Circuit held that the emission budget approach was a reasonable way
for EPA to establish the emission reduction levels that states would need to achieve under the good neighbor
provision, and that EPA provided states a "real choice" by allowing reasonable control alternatives and allowing
states to focus reduction efforts based on local needs or preferences. Id. at 686 88.
108. CAA § 110(a)(2)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(A).
109. Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 249 F.3d 1032, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
110. Several early court cases upheld the EPA's disapproval of SIPs that did not impose continuous emission
limitations on stationary sources, and the Fifth Circuit cautioned against oversimplifying Train's holding that
states control the means in a SIP. Big Rivers Elec. Corp. v. EPA, 523 F.2d 16, 20-22 (6th Cir. 1975); see also
Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 489 FI2d 390, 410 (5th Cir. 1974); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Train, 526 FI2d
1149, 1156 (9th Cir. 1975).
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maintaining the environmental protectiveness of the program.1 11
Because Section 111(d) has been used rarely, there is no analogous case law for
Section 111(d) that clarifies the state-federal division of responsibilities. Given
the vagueness of the statutory directive to create a procedure "similar" to that in
Section 111 (d), the EPA likely has some discretion to vary from the state-federal
arrangement prescribed by Section 110.112 In its historic implementation of
Section 111 (d), however, the EPA has chosen to largely mirror the Section 110
division of responsibilities. The EPA sets minimum limits in the emission
guidelines, and
states have "primary responsibility" for plan development and
1 13
enforcement.'
In the Clean Power Plan, the EPA places great emphasis on the discretion that
states have to develop plans to comply with the EPA's emission guidelines. 114 As
described in Section IV, in response to state requests, the EPA identified a wide
variety of options for states in developing plans, including many ways for states
to facilitate use of cost-effective generation shifting.1 15 The EPA also explicitly

allowed states to use flexibility mechanisms such as trading, averaging, or
crediting. 116

111. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 489 F.2d at 408.
112. The agency need not create a procedure that reflects the "same" state-federal relationship only a
"similar" relationship. Under the Chevron doctrine, courts may also afford the EPA deference in how it
interpreted the degree and character of similarity in this arrangement. On the other hand, the D.C. Circuit in
Sierra Club v. Costle and other cases have described the state-federal division of responsibilities as a core
characteristic of Section 110, potentially limiting the degree to which the EPA may alter the state-federal
division of responsibilities under Section 111(d). 657 F.2d 298, 321, 326 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Moreover, states play
a more direct regulatory role in Section 111(d) than in Section 110. Under Section 111(d), states are charged
with establishing the standards of performance in their state plans. CAA § 111(d)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1)
(states must submit plans "establish[ing] standards of performance"). In contrast, under Section 110, the EPA
establishes the standard, and states develop plans that are designed to meet the federal standard through a
combination of enforceable emission limitations and other measures. CAA § 108(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(2)
(charging the EPA administrator with issuing National Ambient Air Quality Standards). Consequently, under
Section 110 the states may deserve more deference since the statute provides states with more responsibility in
setting the standard.
113. 1975 111(d) Implementing Regulations, 40 Fed. Reg. 53,340, 53,343 (Nov. 17, 1975) ("111(d) is a
hybrid provision, intended to combine primary State responsibility for plan development and enforcement (as in
section 110) with the technology-based approach (making allowances for the costs of controlling existing
sources) taken in section 111 generally."). See also EPA, LEGAL MEMORANDUM ACCOMPANYING CLEAN POWER
PLAN FOR CERTAIN ISSUES 18 21 (2015), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-11/documents/cpplegal-memo.pdf ("EPA has the authority to identify the amount of emission limitation that reflects the
application of the BSER to the affected sources .... States in submitting approvable plans must demonstrate
that [emission performance rates] will be met.").
114. EPA, LEGAL MEMORANDUM ACCOMPANYING CLEAN POWER PLAN FOR CERTAIN ISSUES 23 (2015),

https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-1 1/documents/cpp-legal-memo.pdf ("Following the promulgation of the emission guidelines, the scene shifts to the States .... The emission guidelines give states a wide
range of choices in the design of their plans .... The agency's requirement is that state plans meet emission
guidelines requirements for approvability, including most importantly, the achievement of the emission
performance levels.").
115. Clean Power Plan Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg at 64,826. See discussion infra at sections IV.B and IV.C.
116. Clean Power Plan Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg at 64,826.
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In sum, the flexibility provided by Section 111 (d) in both standard setting and
in the development of compliance strategies is well-suited for regulating GHGs
from power plants. It allows the EPA to set standards that reflect the reductions
that can be achieved from the implementation of cost-effective GHG reduction
strategies. It also allows states to facilitate use of such strategies through their
state plans.
C. LIMITATIONS OF SECTION

111(d)

Despite these flexibilities, Section 111(d) also poses challenges for regulating
GHG emissions from power plants. On its surface, Section 111(d)'s focus on
implementation at the state level seems a poor fit for the interstate nature of the
electricity grid. The EPA's jurisdictional limitations with regards to energy policy
also create challenges. In comparison to a hypothetical national regulatory
approach that would integrate environmental and energy policy goals, Section
111 (d) appears to be less efficient and potentially less effective.
1. Interstate Nature of the U.S. Electricity Grid
As a preliminary matter, many of the limitations created by Section 111 (d) are
related to the way in which the electricity grid in the United States is an interstate
system. The U.S. electricity system is divided into three electricity grid interconnections, one in the west, one in the east, and one that covers most of the state of
Texas. 1 17 Because electricity cannot yet be stored in significant quantities for
grid-scale usage, the electricity system must be able to produce, transmit, and
distribute electricity in balance with customer demand in real time.118 In each of
these interconnections, each electricity generator is linked to other generators and
consumers through high-voltage transmission lines and local distribution networks. At any given second, overall electricity being generated must be balanced
with the electricity demanded by consumers.11 9 Electricity flows cannot be
directed, therefore electricity being generated at a power plant may "end up"
being used by consumers anywhere 12within
the grid. Each interconnection in
0
machine."
single
a
as
"operates
effect
These electricity interconnections are further divided into balancing authorities that are responsible for operations of the grid. 12 1 In competitive electricity
117. U.S. Electric System is Made up of Interconnections and Balancing Authorities, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN. (July 20, 2016), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id-27152.
118. FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, ENERGY PRIMER: A HANDBOOK OF ENERGY MARKET BASICS 37

(2015), http://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/guide/energy-primer.pdf.
119. Id.

120. Brief of Amici Curiae Grid Experts Benjamin F Hobbs, Brendan Kirby, Kenneth J. Lutz, James D.
McCalley, and Brian Parsons in Support of Respondents at 1,West Virginia, et al v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir.
Oct. 23, 2015).
121. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 117.
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wholesale markets, regional transmission organizations ("RTOs")-independent,
non-profit member organizations that administer competitive wholesale electricity markets-serve as balancing authorities. In other cases, individual electric
utilities fulfill these functions. 12 2 For the most part, these sub-regions do not
follow state lines either. For example, in the eastern interconnection, Illinois,
Indiana, Michigan, Kentucky and Ohio all have parts of their state participating
in the PJM RTO, 123 and parts in the Mid-continent Independent System Operator
("MISO"). Most of Texas is its own interconnection-ERCOT-but the northern
part of the state is within the Southwest Power Pool ("SPP") RTO. Even in the
few states where there are single-state electricity markets-such as New York
and California-electricity is still transferred among these RTOs or balancing
regions. 124
As a result of this synchronous grid structure, cross-state provision of electricity occurs all of the time and is inevitable. Coal-fired power plants, hydropower
dams, and windfarms in Wyoming, Montana, and the rest of the Northwest region
serve the electricity demands of large cities like Seattle, Washington and
Portland, Oregon. Solar farms in Nevada and Arizona provide renewable energy
to California. Iowa and Oklahoma often flood the central region with electricity
from wind turbines, particularly during the overnight hours when the wind tends
to blow strongest. Fossil-fuel fired power plants in West Virginia and Pennsylvania generate electricity for the mid-Atlantic seaboard. Boston and other New
England cities rely on wind farms in Maine, hydroelectric projects in Canada, and
other imported power to meet their needs.
These interstate transfers occur regardless of what kind of electric regulatory
model is used in the state. 125 States in the Southeast and in the West generally
operate under a traditional regulatory model, where a vertically-integrated utility
provides all three of the foundational services, electricity generation, transmission, and distribution. These utilities have a monopoly, and state public utility
commissions set rates to compensate the firm on the basis of cost-of-service plus
a reasonable rate of return. Utilities in these states may have a service territory
that aligns with state lines (e.g., Georgia Power), but the utilities will still
purchase power from elsewhere on the grid through bilateral contracts. 126

122. About 60% of the U.S. Electric Power Supply is Managed by RTOs, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Apr. 4,
2011), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id 790.
123. "PJM" previously stood for Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Maryland Regional Transmission Organization. The RTO now encompasses a larger geographic region, and is known simply as PJM.
124. TOM CURRY

&

AUSTIN WHITMAN, ISSUE BRIEF: THE ELECTRICITY SYSTEM AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FEDERAL

CARBON POLLUTION STANDARDS 3 (2014), http://www.georgetownclimate.org/reports/primer-on-structure-of-the-

electric-power-system-and-implications- for- federal-carbon-pollution-standards- for-existing-power-plants.
html.
125. For an excellent discussion on the development of three state models of electricity regulation, see Boyd
& Carlson, supra note 25.
126. Id. at 836.
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In states that have elected to allow wholesale electricity competition (i.e.,
deregulated states), generators compete to have their generating resources dispatched in wholesale power markets operated by RTOs or Independent System
Operators ("ISOs"). With the exception of markets in New York and California,
these wholesale power markets cover multi-state regions, meaning that power
is
127
dispatched for the most part without consideration of geographic location.
This interstate structure means that-in the words of the Supreme Court in
New York v. FederalEnergy Regulatory Commission-"any electricity that enters
the grid immediately becomes a 128
part of a vast pool of energy that is constantly
moving in interstate commerce."
2. Drawbacks of Diverse State Compliance Approaches
The interstate nature of the grid also means that a state-by-state approach to
regulating GHG emissions from the power sector would likely lead to higher
compliance and administrative costs than a program that is national in scope or
allows trading among states or polluters.
As described above, Section 111(d) likely requires the EPA to provide states
with control over the manner in which they choose to meet the minimum
emission guidelines established by the EPA. Under the Section 110 case law of
Michigan v. EPA, the agency must give states "real choices" in how they meet
minimum emission limits. States provided with "real choices" are likely to
actually make different compliance choices, leading to different regulatory
regimes in different states.
A "patchwork" of state compliance approaches would result in a number of
drawbacks. First, a state-by-state compliance approach would limit the ability of
companies to access the most cost-effective compliance strategies. As described
above in section III.A, many of the most cost-effective compliance strategies are
grid-scale strategies like shifting generation to less carbon-intensive combinedcycle natural gas plants or renewables, or implementing energy efficiency
programs. These programs can be implemented anywhere on the interstate
electricity grid, and the most cost-effective mitigation action may not be located
in the state where a power plant is located. For example, the cheapest way for a
firm to reduce emissions from a power plant in Illinois may be to contract for
wind energy from Iowa, or to shift generation to a combined-cycle natural gas
plant owned by the same firm in Missouri. Limiting compliance within the
borders of a single state would prevent a firm from accessing these types of

127. Id. at 836 37. This includes both states that have elected to use competitive models at the wholesale and
retail levels, as well as states operating under a "hybrid" model with a competitive wholesale market and
traditionally regulated retail provision of electricity.
128. The exceptions are the isolated electricity grids of Alaska, Hawaii, and the ERCOT interconnection in
Texas. New York v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 535 U.S. 1, 7 8 (2002).
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cost-effective cross-state compliance options, and therefore raise the overall cost
of the program in comparison to a national program.
That larger compliance regions result in lower-cost compliance opportunities
is especially true where a program allows the use of market instruments such as
emissions allowances or emission rates to facilitate transactions among regulated
entities. Environmental economics research has long shown that larger markets
129 Modeling in the Clean Power Plan context
lower the costs of compliance.
130
insight.
confirms this
Second, different compliance options would be expected to create different
burdens and benefits within different states. As described in more detail below in
section IV.C, in the Clean Power Plan, the EPA allowed states to comply by either
setting emission intensity standards or emission budget standards. Because of the
differences in how these standards operate and their complex interaction, the
emission intensity and emission budget program would likely end up creating
different compliance costs for power plants in similar circumstances. Two
combined-cycle natural gas plants that were otherwise the same but were located
in states adopting different compliance approaches would likely face different
regulatory costs. In both competitive and regulated electricity markets, these
compliance cost differences would impact the competitiveness of the units and
their operation on the grid. 131 In other words, a patchwork regulatory program
would not create a uniform regulatory signal across the electricity grid. Firms
might have different economic incentives in different states, leading to perverse
market outcomes and a failure to capture the most cost-effective emission
reduction opportunities.
A third concern is that many, if not most, power companies are now interstate
132
in nature, with service territories or generating assets in multiple states.
Multiple state compliance programs may mean that the same firm needs to learn
and comply with multiple sets of administrative processes, raising the administrative costs of the program.

129. See, e.g., RICHARD SCHMALENSEE
EXPERIENCE

WITH CAP-AND-TRADE

&

ROBERT STAVINS, LESSONS LEARNED FROM THREE DECADES OF

(2015), https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/getFile.aspx?Id-

1278. Larger, more diverse systems also create other benefits for environmental markets. For example, they
create more market liquidity and reduce the chance of price shocks.
130. See, e.g., CHRIS VAN ATTEN, M.J. BRADLEY & ASSOCS., MODELING ANALYSIS OF EPA'S CLEAN POWER

PLAN 3 (2016), http://mjbradley.com/reports/modeling-analysis-epas-clean-power-plan (broadening the geographic scope of trading can significantly reduce the incremental costs of the program); MARTIN T. ROSS ET AL.,
THE CLEAN POWER

PLAN: IMPLICATIONS OF THREE COMPLIANCE DECISIONS FOR U.S. STATES 41 (2015),

https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/climate/publications/clean-power-plan-implications-three-compliance-decisionsus-states (finding multi-state trading reduces costs).
131. In a competitive wholesale electricity market, a higher compliance cost for a unit would result in a
higher bid into the wholesale electricity market. In a vertically integrated market, a higher compliance cost for a
unit would result in the unit being run less by the utility than a comparable unit with a lower regulatory cost.
132. See, e.g., Utility Service Territories ofNorth America, PLATS (2014), https://www.platts.com/products/
utility- service-territories-north-america-map.
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3. Limitations on the EPA's Role with Regards to Energy Regulation
One other important limitation of Section 111 (d) for regulating GHG pollution
from the power sector is that the EPA's authority is limited to regulating air
pollution, and the EPA cannot prescribe a more holistic regulatory approach that
integrates air pollution with energy policy.
Regulating GHG emissions from the power sector is a significant undertaking.
As described in section III.A, two of the most cost-effective strategies for
reducing GHG pollution from power plants are shifting to cleaner sources of
electricity generation and promoting energy efficiency. These strategies are
already increasingly being deployed by states and power companies for a variety
of reasons related to energy policy as well as securing reductions in non-GHG air
pollutants. States seek to promote energy diversity to guard against market
volatility, reduce energy demand to maintain a reliable electricity grid and avoid
unnecessary investments in energy infrastructure, increase in-state energy related
jobs, and reduce electricity bills for customers. 13 3 Power companies similarly
seek to procure inexpensive electricity, maintain a diverse portfolio of electricity
generation resources, balance generation resources with demand, and respond to
customer preferences.
At the same time, new technologies are also changing the operation of the
electricity system. 134 Consumers are increasingly installing solar panels on their
homes and businesses that meet some or all of their electricity needs and even
provide electricity back to the grid, decreasing the need for utility-generated
electricity. 135 Smart grids and smart appliances reduce demand for electricity. 136
The emergence of grid-scale energy storage technologies means that electricity
demand and electricity generation will no longer need to be balanced in real
time-excess electricity generation from variable resources like solar and wind

133. See, e.g., NEW YORK STATE, 2015 NEW YORK STATE ENERGY PLAN (2015), https://energyplan.ny.gov/
Plans/2015; COMMONWEALTH OF VA., VIRGINIA ENERGY PLAN (2014), https://www.dmme.virginia.gov/DE/
LinkDocuments/2014_VirginiaEnergyPlan/VEP2014.pdf;

VT. DEP'T OF PUB. SERV., 2016 VERMONT COMPREHEN-

SIVE ENERGY PLAN (2016), legislature.vermont.gov/assets/Legislative-Reports/Executive-summary-forweb.pdf; Governor Rick Snyder's 2015 Energy Message, MICH. AGENCY FOR ENERGY (2012), http://www.

michigan.gov/energy/0,4580,7-230-72048 74874 ,00.html.
134. See, e.g., Gavin Bade, The Top 10 Trends Transforming the Electric Power Sector, UTILITY DIVE
(Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/the-top- 10-trends-transforming-the-electric-power-sector/
405798/.
135. US SolarMarket Set to Grow 119% in 2016, Installations to Reach 16 GW, SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS'N
(Mar. 9, 2016), http://www.seia.org/news/us-solar-market-set-grow- 119-2016-installations-reach- 16-gw. Rooftop solar panels and other "behind the meter" forms of electricity generation and storage are referred to as
distributed energy resources.
136. JOHN A. "SKIP" LAITNER ET AL., AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECONOMY, THE ENERGY
EFFICIENCY AND PRODUCTIVITY BENEFITS OF SMART APPLIANCES AND ICT-ENABLED NETWORKS: AN INITIAL
ASSESSMENT, at ii (2014), http://aceee.org/research-report/fl402.
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will be able to be stored for future discharge when needed. 137 These changes are
also creating a variety of energy policy questions, including how to value
electricity from distributed renewable energy sources, how to value energy
storage, and how reduced
demand for utility-generated electricity will affect the
138
utility business model.
An optimal policy response might seek to integrate GHG pollution reduction
and energy policy, since the strategies being used to reduce GHG emissions are
often the same strategies employed in achieving the energy policy goals identified above, or have implications for these policies. A coordinated national policy
to both decarbonize and modernize the electricity system would arguably be the
most efficient way to both reduce GHG emissions and transition to an electricity
system that has greater diversity of energy resources, relies more on decentralized energy resources, and makes better use of energy efficiency.
Under the complex jurisdictional relationship for energy regulation in the
United States, however, the EPA's authority under Section 111 (d) is to address air
pollution (including from energy generation) rather than to engage broadly in
energy policy. Instead, jurisdiction over economic regulation of electricity is split
between states and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC").
In the early twentieth century, states created public utility commissions, with
the goal of regulating electricity and other public utilities such as water and gas to
ensure just and reasonable rates and non-discrimination. 139 In 1935, Congress
authorized the Federal Power Commission ("FPC") to regulate interstate transfers of power, but explicitly preserved states' "jurisdiction over the planning and
siting of generation infrastructure and140ratemaking for retail sales of electricity
and use of local distribution systems."
137. William A. Braff et al., Value of Storage Technologiesfor Wind and Solar Energy, 6 NATURE CLIMATE
CHANGE 964 (2016).
138. Several state utility commissions have launched proceedings to explore and address these questions.
New York State has been a leader in this area by launching its "Reforming Energy Vision" initiative, which is
designed to "enable and facilitate new energy business models for utilities, energy service companies, and
customers." N.Y. ST.DEP'T OF PUB. SERV., REFORMING THE ENERGY VISION 1 (2014) http://documents.dps.ny.gov/

public/Common/ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefld %7B5A9BDBBD- 1EB7-43BE-B751-0C1DAB53F2AA%7D. Massachusetts, Maryland, and Minnesota have begun similar processes. MASS.DEP'T OF PUB. UTILS., INVESTIGATION
BY THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC UTILITIES ON ITS OWN MOTION INTO MODERNIZATION OF THE ELECTRIC GRID

(2012), http://170.63.40.34/DPU/FileroomAPI//api/Attachments/GetUpath-

12-76%2flo2l2dpuvtord.pdf; MINN.

PUB. UTILS. COMM'N, NOTICE OF GRID MODERNIZATION STAKEHOLDER MEETING AND REQUEST FOR STAKEHOLDER
PERSPECTIVES (2015).

139. Boyd & Carlson, supra note 25, at 823.
140. Id. at 824. As the electricity system grew, interstate transfers of electricity became more common, and
some utility commissions sought to regulate these interstate transactions. In 1927, the Supreme Court held that
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine prohibited state utility commissions from regulating these interstate
transfers. Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 89 (1927). This decision created a
gap in regulatory authority, and Congress passed the FPC to fill this gap while preserving state authority for
intrastate electricity regulation. Boyd & Carlson, supra note 25, at 824 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 824(a)-(b) (2015),
declaring that federal regulation of the sale and transmission of electricity shall "extend only to those matters
which are not subject to regulation by the States," and noting that the FPC "shall not have jurisdiction, except as
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Congress has largely maintained this jurisdictional split between state and
federal regulation of electricity. 141 State utility commissions continue to regulate
the siting of power plants and regulation of retail sales of electricity, and states
have "primacy" in this regard.1 42 The FPC's successor agency, the FERC,
regulates the interstate transmission and wholesale sales of electricity. The FERC
also has obligations to ensure the reliability of the energy system.
Within this split jurisdiction of economic regulation of electricity comes the
federal regulation of air pollution under the Clean Air Act. Congress and the
Courts have long recognized that such regulations would have impacts on
the energy system. Section 111 specifically mandates that the EPA consider
energy requirements when setting the best system of emission reduction.1 4 3 In its
American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut decision, the U.S. Supreme Court
noted that in Section 111 Congress entrusted the balancing of "our Nation's
energy needs and the possibility of economic disruption" to the EPA, the "expert
agency."' 44 The D.C. Circuit similarly held in Sierra Club v. Costle that Section
111 requires the EPA to "exercise its discretion to choose an achievable emission
level which represents the best balance of economic, environmental, and energy
1 45
considerations."
In short, the EPA is authorized to take into account energy considerations as
part of its air pollution regulatory actions, but states have primacy over intrastate
electric utility regulation, and the FERC regulates interstate transmission and
wholesale electricity markets. Congress could of course authorize a regulatory
approach that more holistically blends GHG emission reduction and energy
policy goals, but it has not done so to date.
Section 111(d) provides important flexibilities to the EPA in developing
emission guidelines and to states in developing compliance plans, allowing the

specifically provided ... over facilities used for the generation of electric energy or over facilities used in local
distribution or only for the transmission of electric energy in intrastate commerce, or over facilities for the
transmission of electric energy consumed wholly by the transmitter.").
141. The Supreme Court has noted that electricity production, transmission, and distribution is so "fused and
interdependent" that the "whole enterprise" could be federally regulated under Commerce Clause authority.
Conn. Light & Power Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 324 U.S. 515, 530 (1945). See Boyd & Carslon, supra note
25, at 883.
142. Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375 (1983) ("the regulation of utilities is
one of the most important of the functions traditionally associated with the police power of the states"); Munn v.
Ill., 94 U.S. 113 (1877) (standing for the principle that regulation of public utilities generally is one of the core
functions of a state).
143. CAA § 111(a)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1).
144. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 423 24 (2011).
145. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 330 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The court also noted legislative history that
emphasized the long-term, interdisciplinary lens that Congress used in amending Section 111 in 1977. "[T]he
Reports from both Houses on the Senate and House bills illustrate very clearly that Congress itself was using a
long-term lens with a broad focus on future costs, environmental and energy effects of different technological
systems when it discussed section 111." Id. at 331 (citing S. REP. No. 95 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), 3
Legis. Hist. 1371; H.R. REP. No. 95 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 188 (1977), 4Legis. Hist. 2465).
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use of cost-effective GHG reduction strategies like power generation shifting. At
the same time, the cooperative federalism of Section 111(d) is by definition a
state-by-state approach that creates significant drawbacks for regulating GHG
emissions from the interstate electricity system. In addition, jurisdictional limits
prohibit the EPA from prescribing an integrated approach to GHG pollution
control and energy planning.
IV. PROMPTING BROAD STATE ENGAGEMENT THROUGH CLEAN POWER PLAN
RULEMAKING

The development of the Clean Power Plan represents one of the most
significant regulatory actions that the EPA has ever undertaken in resources and
effort. As evidenced by the ongoing litigation, it was also a controversial
rulemaking, with many states and power companies opposed to the regulatory
effort.
Yet the cooperative federalism structure of Section 111(d), combined with
unprecedented outreach by the EPA, prompted robust engagement from nearly all
states, including those opposed to the regulation. In most states, both environment and energy regulators were engaged-an uncommon occurrence.
This engagement led to substantial learning among state environment and
energy regulators about GHG pollution control strategies and policy tools, and
prompted extensive interagency coordination. It also prompted regional discussions about how GHG reduction policies could take place within the context of
regional energy governance structures.
This engagement also produced significant public policy benefits. As a result
of state engagement and the opportunity provided for formal and informal policy
development during the rulemaking process, the EPA and the states were able to
develop innovative, voluntary regulatory mechanisms that solve many-though
not all-of the interstate coordination issues described in section III.C.2. The
EPA similarly developed mechanisms that allow states to take advantage of
existing state energy policies under different compliance approaches.
A.

EPAS OUTREACH

As the most important federal climate action to date, there was never any doubt
that the Clean Power Plan would be a major rulemaking that would attract

intensive public engagement and scrutiny. In anticipation of this high level of
public interest, the EPA sought public engagement to a degree that it never has
before in a rulemaking. 146

146. Clean Power Plan Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,663, 64,946 ("This final rule is the result of
unprecedented outreach and engagement with states, tribes, utilities, and other stakeholders, with stakeholders
providing more than 4.3 million comments on the proposed rule.").
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The EPA particularly focused on soliciting input from states, which the EPA
referred to as "co-regulators" in a "partnership" created by the cooperativefederalism framework of Section 111(d). 147 President Barack Obama underscored the importance of such outreach in his 2013 memorandum that directed
the EPA to proceed with development of the Clean Power Plan. The memorandum directed EPA to "launch" regulatory development through "direct engagement with States, as they will play a central role in establishing and implementing
standards for existing power plants ... on issues informing the design of the

program."

148

The minimum components of notice-and-comment rulemaking include the
promulgation of a proposed rule that includes the legal basis of the rule and the
agency's reasons and bases for formulating the rule, an opportunity for the public
to comment on the rule, and the issuance of a final rule that responds to comments
that raise significant issues. 149 In practice, however, providing input to the agency
while it is developing the proposed rule is among the most important opportunities to shape an agency's regulatory approach. 150
The EPA explicitly sought extensive input from states and other stakeholders
in this pre-proposal phase. This included holding twenty early "listening sessions" in 2011 and 2013,151 offering one-on-one meetings and calls with each
state regulator, and organizing, encouraging, and attending meetings where

147. Clean Power Plan Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,666 ("CAA section 111(d) creates a partnership
between the EPA and the states under which the EPA establishes emission guidelines and the states take the lead
on implementing them by establishing emission standards or creating plans that are consistent with the EPA
emission guidelines."); Economy-Wide Impacts of President Obama's Air Agenda: Hearing Before Senate
Committee on Environment and Public Works, 114th Cong. 84 (2015) (statement of Acting Assistant
Administrator for Air and Radiation Janet McCabe) (referring to states as "co-regulators" in context of
development of the Clean Power Plan); EPA, CLEAN POWER PLAN TOOLBOX FOR STATES, https://web.archive.org/
web/20161224101255/https://www.epa.gov/cleanpowerplantoolbox (last visited May 12, 2017) ("As coregulators, states will develop plans to meet the guidelines in the Clean Power Plan.").
148. The memorandum also directed the EPA to engage with "leaders in the power sector, labor leaders,
non-governmental organizations, other experts, tribal officials, other stakeholders, and members of the public."
Memorandum from President Barack Obama to EPA Administrator Regina McCarthy, Power Sector Carbon
Pollution Standards (June 25, 2013) https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/25/
presidential-memorandum-power- sector-carbon-pollution- standards.
149. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553; see also Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass'n, 135 S.Ct.
1199, 1203 (2015) (describing three-step process for agency rulemaking).
150. See, e.g., Kimberly D. Krawiec, Don't "Screw Joe the Plummer": The Sausage-Making of Financial
Reform, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 53, 84 (2013) (finding that the preproposal stage is critical to agenda setting); David J.
Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 Sup. Ct. Rev. 201, 231 32 (arguing that
agencies feel pressure to complete bulk of work prior to the proposal).
151. EPA held eleven listening sessions in October and November of 2013, one in each of the EPA Regions
and one in EPA headquarters. See EPA, Outreach on Reducing Carbon Pollutionfrom Existing Power Plants,
https://web.archive.org/web/20160804041 706/https://www.epa.gov/cleanpowerpIan/outreach-reducingcarbon-pollution-existing-power-plants (last visited May 10, 2017). EPA also held five listening sessions for
different categories of stakeholders in February and March of 2011, and four similar listening sessions in
September 2013. EPA, Past Clean Power Plan Listening Sessions, https://www.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/pastlistening-sessions (last visited May 10, 2017).
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152
multi-state planning efforts were being discussed.
In addition, the EPA released a pre-rulemaking white paper targeted specifi-

cally at states that solicited written input on a variety of topics, including what

experiences states had with GHG emission reduction programs and trends, what
strategies the EPA should consider as potential best systems of emission reduction, and what flexibilities the EPA should make available to states for compliance.15 3 The EPA provided a web-based form and email for the submission of
pre-proposal comments. 154
B.

STATES REQUEST FLEXIBILITY, AND EPA HAS A DUTY TO RESPOND

A large number of states provided pre-proposal input to the EPA. This included
written comments from environment or energy agencies from at least thirty-one
states, 155 in addition to remarks by state officials in listening sessions and
one-on-one meetings or calls with EPA. Given the significant opposition to the

152. See Clean Power Plan Proposed Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. at 34,845.
153. The paper identified key considerations in designing regulations under Section 111(d) and asked for
input on these topics from states and stakeholders and was intended to "spark a conversation about new ideas
and concepts" that would be continued in an "open and interactive dialogue" in fall 2013. In the document, the
EPA described Section 111(d) as "allow[ing] for collaboration between EPA and states" and asked about what
programs states are already implementing that could contribute to emissions reductions and what their
experiences were with these programs. EPA, CONSIDERATIONS IN THE DESIGN OFA PROGRAM TO REDUCE CARBON

POLLUTION FROM EXISTING POWER PLANTS (2013), https://www.scdhec.gov/HomeAndEnvironmenUDocs/Clean
Power/Statequestionsl 1 d9-23-13%20(2).pdf [hereinafter EPA 111 (d) Regulatory Design Questions].
154. Clean Power Plan Proposed Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. at 34,845.
155. Written comments from individual states were submitted by the Arizona Department of Environmental
Quality; California Air Resources Board; Hawaii's Department of Health, Public Utilities Commission and
Department of Business, Economic Development and Tourism; Idaho Governor's Office of Energy Resources;
Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality; Kansas Department of Health and the Environment;
Kentucky Energy and Environment Cabinet; Michigan Department of Environmental Quality; Minnesota
Pollution Control Agency; Missouri Public Service Commission; New Mexico Environment Department; North
Dakota Department of Health and Public Service Commission; Oklahoma Department of Environmental
Quality; South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control; Utah Governor's Energy Advisor;
West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection, Wisconsin Public Services Commission and Department of Natural Resources. Outreach Feedback on the CAA Section 111(d) Existing Source EGU Greenhouse
Gas Rulemaking, https://www.regulations.gov/docketBrowser?rpp 25&so DESC&sb commentDue
Date&po-0&D-EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0020. A number of additional state agencies participated in joint
comments, including the Alabama Department of Environmental Management; California Energy Commission
and Public Utilities Commission; Colorado Department of Public Health and the Environment; Connecticut
Department of Energy and Environmental Protection; Delaware Department of Natural Resources and
Environmental Control and Public Service Commission; Illinois Commerce Commission; Indiana Department
of Environmental Management; Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection and Energy Resources; Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality; New Hampshire Department of Environmental
Services; New York State Department of Environmental Conservation and Public Service Commission; Ohio
Environmental Protection Agency; Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management and Office of
Energy Resources; Vermont Agency of Natural Resources and Public Service Board; and Washington State
Department of Ecology. Outreach Feedback on the CAA Section 111 (d) Existing Source EGU Greenhouse Gas
Rulemaking, https://www.regulations.gov/docketBrowser?rpp 25&so DESC&sb commentDueDate&po=
0&D-EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0020.

2017]

MAKING THE MOST OF COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM

EPA's regulation by many states, states were divided on whether the EPA should
15 6
regulate at all and on what basis the EPA should set the emission guidelines.
At the same time, nearly all states that commented in the preproposal phase
requested broad flexibility in how states could comply with the emissions
standards. In comments and hearings, states as diverse as Arizona, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New
York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah,
Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and West Virginia all asked for flexibility in
157
state compliance.

156. Compare Letter from 15 States to Gina McCarthy, the EPAAdministrator (Dec. 16, 2013), https://www.
regulations.gov/document?D EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0020-0059 (urging development of a stringent but flexible
framework) [hereinafter Joint Preproposal Comment from 15 Supporting States], with Letter from States of NC,
AL, WV, IN, MI, OH, KS, AZ, and WI State Environmental Protection Agencies (May 8, 2014), https://www.
regulations.gov/document?D-EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0020-0167 (urging the EPA to only consider inside-thefence measures and urging the EPA to delay all compliance deadlines until after inevitable litigation). The
author was involved in facilitating the development of the Joint Preproposal Comment from 15 Supporting
States as part of his work with the Georgetown Climate Center.
157. See, e.g., Preproposal Comments of Arizona Department of Environmental Quality, (Dec. 17, 2013),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D-EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0020-0199 ("EPA should provide the flexibility for states to account for potential generation displacement"); Preproposal Comments of Kansas Dept. of
Health & Environment (Apr. 4, 2014), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D-EPA-HQ-OAR-20140020-0163 (raising concerns about EPA's authority to regulate, but also advising that ifEPA moves forward with
regulations, "states should have flexibility in implementing the standards to help reduce compliance costs... For
example, states could allow sources credit for emission reductions from "beyond the fence line"); Preproposal
Comments of Kentucky Energy and Environment Cabinet (Oct. 22, 2013), https://www.regulations.gov/
document?D EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0020-0037 (presenting a regulatory framework proposal preferred by
Kentucky that "provides needed flexibility" allowing use of "demand and supply-side energy efficiency and
renewable and other low-carbon generation sources" and using a "flexible, mass-emissions approach");
Preproposal Comments of Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (Apr. 9, 2014), https://www.
regulations.gov/document?D-EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0020-0162 ("While LDEQ does not support the development of greenhouse gas standards for existing power plants.., if EPA does decide to move forward.., it is
essential that the final rule provide States with implementation flexibility"); Preproposal Comments of
Michigan Department of Environmental Quality, docketed in Government Industry Official Statements - Part 7
(Dec. 16, 2013), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D-EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0020-0159 (urging EPA to
allow flexibility in state compliance, including a mass-based approach and ways to incorporate plant shut
downs, renewable energy, and energy efficiency); Preproposal Comments from Oklahoma Department of
Environmental Quality, docketed in Government Industry Official Statements - Part 7 (Dec. 5, 2013),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D-EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0020-0159 ("Any carbon standard should be
written as flexibly as possible. This will allow states to take advantage of a broad array of compliance
mechanisms from a rate-based unit by unit approach to a region wide cap and trade type program"); Preproposal
Comments of Utah Governor's Energy Advisor, docketed in Government Industry Official Statements - Part 7
(Dec. 2, 2013), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D-EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0020-0159 ("Any EPA proposal should follow the Clean Air Act's deference to states, provide maximum flexibility, and take advantage of
a wide range of energy sources and technologies"); Comments of Wisconsin Public Service Commission and
Department of Natural Resources, docketed in Government Industry Official Statements - Part 7 (Dec. 13,
2013), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D-EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0020-0159 (EPA should allow states
programmatic flexibility, including use of existing state RPS and energy efficiency programs and compliance
across states). Additionally, state agencies from California, Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico, North Dakota,
South Carolina, and West Virginia included similar requests for flexibility. See Standards of Performance for
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Many states specifically asked for the flexibility to build on existing state
energy programs, reflecting the widespread adoption of state renewable energy
and energy efficiency programs. Twenty-nine states have adopted renewable
portfolio standards ("RPS"), policies that require power companies to meet an
increasing percentage of electricity demand with electricity from renewable
resources.158 These and other state policies to promote renewable energy typically receive broad public support, both because of their lack of emissions and
because of their beneficial economic impact. 159 As a result, states are interested in
being able to use or credit those programs as part of state plans. For example, the
two chairs of the bipartisan Governors' Wind Energy Coalition-South Dakota
Governor Dennis Daugaard and Washington Governor Jay Inslee-urged the
EPA to allow use of wind energy "as an eligible measure for states to utilize in
achieving compliance" on behalf of the coalition, while at the same time noting
that not all members supported EPA's proposed action. 160 Arizona, Louisiana,
Missouri, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wisconsin all similarly urged EPA
to allow use or crediting of renewable energy in compliance in written com-

Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR2013-0602, https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602. Representatives of state agencies from 15 states who were supportive of EPA action called for a "stringent but flexible" framework in joint
comments. Joint Preproposal Comment from 15 Supporting States (Dec. 16,2013), https://www.regulations.gov/
document?D =EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0020-0059 (encouraging "EPA to develop a stringent but flexible framework that ... recogniz[es] that states may employ a variety of strategies, including successful state programs
already in force"). The agencies participating in this letter were from California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York, Oregon, Rhode
Island, Vermont, and Washington. Flexibility for state compliance was also a key theme of EPA's 2013 listening
sessions. See, e.g., Summary of EPA Headquarters Listening Session in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 7, 2013),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D =EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0020-0050 ("Speakers urged EPA to provide
states ample time and flexibility for designing their state regulations."); Summary of EPA Region 4 Listening
Session in Atlanta, Georgia, (Oct. 23, 2013), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D =EPA-HQ-OAR-20140020-0034 ("States need flexibility to design and implement the program"); Summary of EPA Region 6
Listening Session in Dallas, TX (Nov. 7, 2013), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OAR2014-0020-0043 ("States need to be given the maximum amount of flexibility in complying with any such
carbon standard"). A compilation of all state Clean Power Plan comments relevant to points made in this Article
is on file with the author.
158. See DSIRE, Renewable PortfolioStandardPoliciesMap (2017), http://ncsolarcen-prod. s3.amazonaws.
com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Renewable-Portfolio-Standards.pdf. Many states have also adopted other
policies that also support renewable energy deployment. See generally DSIRE, State Renewable Energy and
Energy Efficiency ProgramsSummary Tables, http://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program/tables (last visited
May 15, 2017) (listing various state incentive and regulatory programs to promote renewable energy).
159. For example, in recent years legislative proposals to repeal RPSs have been introduced in at least
eighteen state legislatures, and all but two of those efforts failed. In contrast, a number of states have actually
strengthened and expanded their RPS programs recently. Arroyo et al., supra note 77, at 400-01.
160. Letter from the Governors' Wind Energy Coalition Chairs to Gina McCarthy, the EPA Administrator
(May 7, 2014), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0020-0191.
There are 20
Governors in the coalition, which has since been renamed to be the Governors' Wind and Solar Energy
Coalition. See The Governors Wind & Solar Energy Coalition,http://www.governorswindenergycoalition.org/
(last visited May 15, 2017).
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162
ments, 161 as did the fifteen states that were supportive of EPA action.
EPA received similarly widespread support for allowing states to use energy
efficiency programs that reduce electricity demand as compliance measures.
Such policies are also broadly implemented by states, and are often considered
the least-cost way to meet increasing electricity demand. Twenty states have
adopted energy efficiency resource standards ("EERS"), which set mandatory
targets for the amount of electricity demand that will be met through efficiency
measures, and many other efficiency-promoting policies are also broadly in use
by states. 163 Reflecting this support, the three national associations that respectively represent air agencies, utility commissioners, and energy agencies jointly
submitted comments requesting that the EPA allow the use of demand-side
energy efficiency programs. 164 The associations called on the EPA to provide
"great deference" to state efforts and provide ways to credit efficiency from those
programs. 165 Arizona, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Utah, and Wisconsin included similar calls in their written comments, 16 6 as did
the states supporting the rulemaking. 167 Summaries from the eleven listening
sessions held by the EPA in 2013 indicate that participants commonly asked for
compliance options that would allow states to use existing renewable or efficiency programs for compliance. 168
A large number of states also asked EPA to allow the use of emission credit
trading or other market-based mechanisms in state compliance plans. This
included states that had already implemented cap-and-trade programs to reduce
GHG emissions on their own initiative, specifically the nine northeastern states
participating in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative ("RGGI"), a multi-state
program capping carbon pollution from power plants, and California, which

161. Comments of Arizona, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wisconsin, supra note 157; Preproposal
Comments of North Dakota Public Service Commission, docketed in Government Industry Official Statements - Part 7 (Feb. 28 2014), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0020-0159.
See also compilation of state comments (on file with the author).
162. See Joint Preproposal Comment from 15 Supporting States, supra note 156, at 16-17, 25, 31 33 (both
requesting that EPA base BSER in part on emission reductions due to shifts in generation to renewable energy
and urging EPA to allow states to use renewable energy programs as part of compliance).
163. See DSIRE, Energy Efficiency Resource Standards and Goals Detailed Summary Map (2016),
http://ncsolarcen-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/20 16/1 /Energy-Efficiency-ResourceStandards.pdf.
164. Letter from William S. Becker, Executive Director, National Association of Clean Air Agencies
("NACAA"), on behalf of NACAA, NARUC, and NASEO, to Gina McCarthy, the EPAAdministrator (May 12,
2014) https://www.regulations.gov/document?D =EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0020-0168.
165. Id. The comments also asked the EPA to provide a non-exhaustive list of approaches for including
energy efficiency.
166. See comments from these states supra notes 157 and 161; see also compilation of state comments (on
file with the author).
167. Joint Preproposal Comment from 15 Supporting States, supra note 156, at 16 17, 25, 31 33 (both
requesting that EPA base BSER in part on reductions in GHG emissions due to demand-side energy efficiency
and urging EPA to allow states to use such programs as part of compliance).
168. Summaries of EPA 2013 Listening Sessions, supra note 157.
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operates an economy-wide cap-and-trade program. 169 These states asked EPA to
allow their existing programs to potentially serve as a basis for compliance. 170
Other states, including Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Louisiana, Minnesota, North
Dakota, Oregon, and Washington, asked EPA to give them the option of using
market-based mechanisms as they developed their plans. 171
Other compliance flexibilities requested by states in comments included the
option to comply through a limit on the total tons of GHG emissions emitted from
covered power plants in the state (referred to as a mass-based
standard), 172 and
173
approaches.
the option to develop multi-state compliance
In short, state officials from across the political spectrum requested that the
EPA allow states broad flexibility to integrate existing state energy programs.
Since both the language of Section 111(d) and Section 110 case law strongly
suggest that states have discretion over the manner of their compliance, 174 the

EPA had an obligation to respond to these requests. At the same time, the EPA is
also tasked with ensuring that state plans meet the minimum level of environmen-

169. Letter from RGGI State Agencies to Gina McCarthy, the EPA Administrator (Dec. 2, 2013),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D =EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0020-0055 (recommending that the EPA use
its authority "to ensure significant overall reductions in carbon emissions, but to apply the standard in a flexible
manner that empowers states to develop market-based greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction programs
designed to work for their region(s)."); Letter from the California Air Resources Board to Gina McCarthy, the
EPA Administrator (Dec. 27, 2013), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-00200060 (calling upon EPA to "build upon working programs in the states, supporting the continued operation and
extension of these programs as tools to achieve and demonstrate compliance with the standards in substantial
part" including California's cap-and-trade program and portfolio of other clean energy and efficiency
programs); see also Joint Preproposal Comment from 15 Supporting States, supra note 156, at 2 (these joint
comments were signed onto by both RGGI states and California and called on EPA to "[a]llow for a variety of
rigorous state compliance options, including options for compliance through participation in regional emission
budget trading programs and state portfolio programs").
170. Joint Preproposal Comment from 15 Supporting States, supra note 156, at 20. For a more detailed
discussion of how these programs together with state RPS and efficiency programs helped create the legal
and policy basis for the Clean Power Plan, see Arroyo et al., supra note 77 at 406-12.
171. See comments from these states supra notes 157 and 161; see also compilation of state comments (on
file with the author).
172. Joint Preproposal Comment from 15 Supporting States, supra note 156, at 22. A mass-based limit also
referred to as a GHG emission budget is used in the RGGI and California cap-and-trade program. It contrasts
with an emission rate standard that limits the rate of GHG emissions per megawatt hour of electricity generated.
There were a variety of reasons that some states were interested in having the option to comply on a mass-basis,
including that it provided "credit" for GHG reductions resulting from power plant retirements and was simpler
to administer. See discussion infra accompanying notes 184 85; see also LISSA LYNCH ET AL., GEORGETOWN
CLIMATE CENTER CLEAN POWER PLAN IMPLEMENTATION:

OVERVIEW OF POTENTIAL COMPLIANCE PATHWAYS

(2015), http://www.georgetownclimate.org/reports/an-overview-of-potential-clean-power-plan-compliancepathways.html.
173. Joint Preproposal Comment from 15 Supporting States, supra note 156, at 26; Comment of Arizona
Department of Environmental Quality (Dec. 17, 2013), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D =EPA-HQOAR-2014-0020-0199; Letter from Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, Environmental Services
to Gina McCarthy, the EPA Administrator (Apr. 9, 2014), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D =EPAHQ-OAR-2014-0020-0162.
174. See discussion supra section III.B.

2017]

MAKING THE MOST OF COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM

tal protectiveness expressed in the emission guidelines. One result of allowing for
a diversity of compliance approaches-at least in the electricity sector-is that it
makes it more complicated to ensure that states programs will meet minimum
levels of protectiveness under different scenarios.
For example, one key consideration for the EPA was how two different
compliance approaches, such as an emission intensity limit and an emission
budget, would be equivalent in their level of emission limitation, even though
these two approaches are measured evaluated using different metrics. 1 7 5 A
second consideration was whether different approaches would provide the same
level of certainty in emission limitation. For example, energy efficiency projectslike the weatherization of buildings or replacement of incandescent bulbs with
more efficient LED lighting-reduce the demand for electricity. In contrast to a
binding limit on emissions from a power plant, however, there is less certainty in
how much electricity usage a specific efficiency project will avoid, or how those
avoided megawatt hours of electricity translate into carbon pollution reductions. 17 6 The EPA needed to assess and account for such differences in compliance approaches to ensure that the approaches were similarly rigorous. A third
consideration of this type was how state programs would interact with each other.
Should the EPA be concerned if energy efficiency programs being credited in one
state were actually reducing emissions, and therefore also counting toward
compliance, in another state (i.e., was double counting occurring)? These types of
considerations meant that while the EPA had an obligation to respond to state
requests for flexibility, it needed to provide significant detail on how states could
implement different approaches in ways that would meet the required level of
environmental protectiveness.
In sum, states nearly universally asked for broad flexibility in developing plans
to comply with the emission guidelines. Many states specifically asked for
compliance options that would allow them to build on their existing energy
policies or use cost-effective approaches. The EPA had a duty to respond to these

175. An emission intensity approach is measured by a rate of emissions per unit of output, for example,
pounds CO 2 emitted per megawatt hour of electricity generated. An emission budget would measure absolute
carbon dioxide emissions, e.g., pounds of C0 2 , independent of the quantity of electricity generated. In response
to state requests, EPA identified individual state budgets that it determined were equivalent to the minimum
rate-based standards. EPA also recognized, however, that an emission budget plan would create a potential
incentive for regulated entities to shift generation to uncovered new sources in a way that would not occur under
an emission intensity plan, and therefore included a requirement that emission budget plans mitigate this
incentive for emissions leakage to new sources. Clean Power Plan Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,820 26,
64,834; see also LYNCH ET AL., supra note 172, at 2 (discussion of the difference between rate-based and
mass-based approaches).
176. There are well-established protocols for estimating carbon pollution savings from energy efficiency
projects. These protocols use aggregation and conservative estimates to produce well-regarded projections of
savings, but they still provide less certainty than direct limitations of emissions from a power plant. See EPA,
DRAFT EVALUATION MEASUREMENT AND VERIFICATION (EM&V) GUIDANCE FOR DEMAND-SIDE ENERGY EFFI-

CIENCY (EE) (2015).
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requests, but also had an obligation to structure the approval guidelines for these
compliance options in a way that ensured their environmental protectiveness and
equivalence.
C. BY OFFERING CONCRETE CHOICES EPA PROMPTS ENGAGEMENT

A defining feature of the Clean Power Plan's rulemaking process is that the
EPA proposed multiple compliance approaches in response to state requests.
Offering multiple approaches created "real choices" for states, consistent with the
approach required of EPA under Section 110.177 It also prompted states to
undertake intensive analyses and stakeholder consultations that went far beyond
the modest public engagement requirements of the Clean Power Plan, 178 both to
inform their comments on the proposal, and to begin consideration of what
compliance approach might be best suited for their state.
1. The EPA Proposal
The EPA responded to the states' requests for compliance flexibility by
proposing and taking comment on multiple pathways for compliance in the
proposed rule, issued June 2, 2014.179 These compliance options were explicitly
structured in ways that allowed states to build on existing programs, including
renewable and efficiency programs and existing market-based programs. 8 0 The
EPA also offered options for incorporating market-based182mechanisms, 8 1 and
proposed mechanisms for multiple states to work together.
The release of the proposed rule was a major event that magnified public
interest and intensified interest and focus from states. The EPA again held public
hearings and conducted intensive outreach to state officials, participating in over
300 meetings. 18 3 The EPA also extended the original 120-day comment period to

177. See the discussion supra text accompanying notes 105 107 about how courts have interpreted the
division of responsibilities between EPA and the states, especially the D.C. Circuit's decision in Michigan v.
EPA, holding that EPA must provide a "real choice" in compliance options.
178. The Clean Power Plan required states to hold a hearing prior to submitting their final plan and
documentation "of any conducted community outreach and community involvement, including engagement
with vulnerable communities." Clean Power Plan Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,946 (codified at 40 C.FIR.
§§ 60.5745(a)(11), (12)).
179. Clean Power Plan Proposed Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. at 34,900 03. This Article provides a detailed
description of the final rule, and omits a discussion of the proposed rule to avoid unnecessary duplication. For a
detailed summary of state compliance options and flexibilities in the proposed rule, see LISSA LYNCH ET AL.,
GEORGETOWN CLIMATE CENTER, PROPOSAL SUMMARY: KEY ISSUES FOR STATES IN EPA'S CLEAN POWER PLAN
PROPOSED RULE 6-8 (2014), http://www.georgetownclimate.org/reports/detailed-summary-of-the-epa-s-proposedrule-to-limit-carbon-pollution-from-the-power-sector.html.
180. Clean Power Plan Proposed Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. at 34,900, 34,918 19.
181. Id. at 34,900.
182. Id. at 34,892, 34,900.
183. Clean Power Plan Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,704.
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165 days in response to requests from stakeholders.I8 4 In the rule, the EPA
solicited comment on dozens of specific issues, including many issues related to
how states could structure compliance plans. 18 5 There was a tremendous amount
of interest from state officials in understanding the proposal, the potential
compliance pathways, and in providing comment to the EPA.
The EPA received an unprecedented 4.3 million comments, 18 6 and these
included comments from nearly every state. 18 7 Foreshadowing the litigation,
states again split on the question of whether the EPA had the authority to regulate
and whether it was taking an appropriate approach to setting the level of
stringency of the standard, with many states weighing in strongly on both
sides. 188

At the same time, the majority of states-including those opposing the EPA's
regulatory action-provided detailed technical input on the proposal.18 9 Many

184. EPA, FACT SHEET, CLEAN POWER PLAN & CARBON POLLUTION STANDARDS KEY DATES (2015) https://
web.archive.org/web/2017 0417 191 820/https://www.epa. gov/cleanpowerplan/fact-sheet-clean-power-plancarbon-pollution-standards-key-dates#print.
185. LYNCH ETAL., supra note 179.
186. Clean Power Plan Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,663.
187. State agencies, or in some cases the governor, from forty-seven states provided comments on the rule.
Comments on Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602, https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D=EPA-HQOAR-2013-0602 (last visited May 15, 2017); see also BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER, CLEAN POWER PLAN
COMMENTS MAP, https://bipartisanpolicy.org/energy-map/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2017).
188. Compare Comment from Attorneys General of New York, California, Connecticut, District of
Columbia, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, and
the Corporation Counsel of the City of New York on the Proposed Clean Power Plan Rule (Dec. 1, 2014),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D
EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602-23191 (arguing EPA must regulate GHG
emissions from power plants under Section 111(d) and that EPA's approach to setting the standard was
appropriate), with Comment from the Attorneys General of the States of Oklahoma, West Virginia, Nebraska,
Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Utah and Wyoming on Proposed Clean Power Plan Rule (Nov. 24, 2014), https://www.
regulations.gov/document?D-EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602-25433 (arguing that the EPA does not have authority
to regulate GHG emissions from power plants under Section 111(d) and that even if it did the outside-thefenceline approach is impermissible).
189. See, e.g., Alabama Department of Environmental Management Comment on the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) Proposed Rule: Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units (Nov. 21, 2014), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D EPAHQ-OAR-2013-0602-23584 (Although opposing regulations and arguing that they are illegal, also offering
technical comments in an appendix); Joint Comments of Arkansas Department of Environmental Quality and
Arkansas Public Service Commission Comment on the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Proposed
Rule: Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units
(Nov. 26, 2014), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D-EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602-19420 (agencies submitted joint technical comments while state attorney general submitted comments on the legality of the rule);
Arizona Department of Environmental Quality Comment on the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
Proposed Rule: Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units (Dec. 19, 2014), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D-EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602-27329
(agency submitted technical comments on building block two in addition to legal comments arguing that the
rule was not legally authorized); Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection Comment on
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Proposed Rule: Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing
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states provided detailed comments on the assumptions that EPA used to develop

the proposed minimum emission levels and how those were applied to develop
state targets. 190 Most states also requested more time to develop compliance
plans.1 91

States reiterated calls for flexibility in compliance, but also asked for addi192
tional specificity from the EPA on what types of plans would be approvable.

Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units (Dec. 1, 2014), https://www.regulations.gov/document?
D-EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602-24208 (agency submitted technical comments on building block implementation and methodology, rate to mass conversion, EM&V, EE and RE compliance credits, interstate effects, and
state implementation plans). In addition comments from state agencies from Colorado, Florida, Kentucky, Iowa,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada,
Ohio, New Mexico, South Carolina, and Vermont, also provided detailed input on the proposal. See Comments
on Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing Sources: Electric Utility Generating
Units, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602, https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D-EPA-HQ-OAR-20130602. See also compilation of state comments (on file with the author).
190. See Comments on Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602, https://www.regulations.gov/docket?
D-EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602. See also compilation of state comments (on file with the author).
191. See, e.g., Mississippi Public Service Commission Comment on the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) Proposed Rule: Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units (Dec. 1, 2014), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D-EPA-HQ-OAR-20130602-22931 ("In order to achieve the most efficient approach, which is likely multi-state, EPA should allow
sufficient time to fully plan, as well as to understand and address concerns with such an approach."); Alabama
Department of Environmental Management Comment on the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
Proposed Rule: Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units (Nov. 21, 2014), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D-EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-060223584; Joint Comments of Arkansas Department of Environmental Quality and Arkansas Public Service
Commission Comment on the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Proposed Rule: Carbon Pollution
Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units (Nov. 26, 2014),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D-EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602-19420. Additionally, other state agencies from Missouri, North Carolina, Mississippi, Nevada, Ohio, New Mexico, Michigan, South Carolina,
Kentucky, Colorado and Montana expressed similar concerns, see Comments on Standards of Performance for
Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR2013-0602, https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D-EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602. See also compilation of state
comments (on file with the author).
192. Alabama Department of Environmental Management Comment on the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) Proposed Rule: Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units (Nov. 21, 2014), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D-EPA-HQ-OAR-20130602-23584 ("EPA's proposal does not provide adequate detail on how compliance should be determined. EPA
should provide model compliance calculations"); Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental
Protection Comment on the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Proposed Rule: Carbon Pollution
Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units (Dec. 1, 2014),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D-EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602-24208 (agency recognizes the option
for rate-based targets, but comments that EPA should provide additional clarify in the final rule making "to
avoid potential double-counting of RE/EE measures"); New Mexico Environment Department Comment on
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Proposed Rule: Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing
Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units (Dec. 1, 2014), https://www.regulations.gov/document?
D-EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602-27259 (agency recommends "EPA should include in the procedures for acting
on complete state plans the range of options Congress included in CAA Section 110, including partial
approval/partials disapproval and conditional approval" with the reasoning that limiting options for approval is
"counterproductive".); Kentucky Energy and Environment Cabinet Comment on the Environmental Protection
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This included requests that EPA propose specific mass-based emission budgets,
so that states would understand how mass-based approaches would compare with
rate-based approaches. 193 Several states requested that the EPA provide model
rules for one or more approaches. 194
2. Final Rule and Proposed Model Rules
The EPA released its final rule on August 3, 2015. The final rule maintained
multiple compliance options for states, though these options were revised from
the proposal. These options continue to allow states to base compliance plans on
a wide variety of state policies if states choose to do so. 195 The EPA also provided
much more specificity on what compliance approaches could look like, including
through two proposed model rules that were issued at the same time as the final
rule. An important component of the emission guidelines were the procedural
requirements for state submittal, which allowed states the option of a two-year
extension of the deadline for submitting a final plan but required states to show
that they were making progress in considering compliance pathways.
The EPA expressed the final emission guidelines as nationally uniform
performance standards for two sub-categories of power plants: fossil-fuel-fired

Agency (EPA) Proposed Rule: Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units (Nov. 26, 2014), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OAR-20130602-22574 (agency notes that in order for state plans to be submitted by June 2016, it is "therefore critical that
EPA issue guidance documents or promulgate appropriate regulatory text to provide states with certainty in
establishing and implementing applicable requirements under a Section 111 (d) plan."). See also compilation of
state comments (on file with the author).
193. See Letter from the Arkansas Department of Environmental Quality and Arkansas Public Service
Commission Comment on the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Proposed Rule: Carbon Pollution
Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units to Gina McCarthy, the
EPA Administrator (Nov. 26, 2014), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-060222736 ("The Agencies request that the final EPA rule should provide a presumptive translation of its final and
interim rate-based goals to mass-based goals."); see also Letter from the Alabama Department of Environmental
Management Comment on the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Proposed Rule: Carbon Pollution
Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units to Gina McCarthy, the
EPA Administrator (Nov. 21, 2014), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-060223584. See also compilation of state comments (on file with the author).
194. See, e.g., Comments of Bureau of Air Quality, South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental
Control (DHEC) on the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Proposed Rule: Carbon Pollution Emission
Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units (Dec. 1, 2014), https://www.
regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602-22584 (agency suggests there may be states that
miss the compliance plan deadline, in which case it is "crucial that EPA indicate the specifics of a federal plan in
the final rule."). See also compilation of state comments (on file with the author).
195. Clean Power Plan Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,666 ("States, in their CAA section 111(d) plans, will be
able to rely on, and extend, programs they may already have created to address emissions of air pollutants, and
in particular C0 2 , from the utility power sector or to address the sector from an overall perspective. Those states
committed to Integrated Resource Planning (IRP) will be able to establish their CO 2 reduction plans within that
framework, while states with a more deregulated power sector system will be able to develop CO 2 reduction
plans within that specific framework.").
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steam-generating units, and natural gas combustion turbines. 196 The minimum
performance level for all existing coal-, oil-, and gas-fired steam power plants is
1305 pounds per megawatt hour ("lbs/MWh") in 2030, and the minimum
performance level for all existing combined cycle natural gas power plants is 771
lbs/MWh in 2030.197
States can comply with these emission guidelines most directly by establishing
identical performance rates on each unit of each type in their state, as provided
for in the EPA's proposed model emission rate plan. An important component of
the rate-based plan is the ability for affected units to use emission rate credits
("ERCs"). 198 These credits can be generated by new renewable and nuclear

energy sources for each megawatt hour of zero-carbon electricity that is generated, or by new energy efficiency programs for each megawatt hour of electricity
that is avoided.1 99 The credits can be applied to the compliance calculation of an
affected power plant as megawatt hours of zero-emitting generation.
In order to provide more flexibility for states, the EPA also provided states with
the option of expressing the performance standard as an equivalent mass-based
emission limit-an emission budget-that would apply to all covered sources in
the state. This would be expressed as the total tons of CO 2 that may be emitted
from both categories of sources in each state. 200 The EPA provided each state
with a mass-based emission budget that was based on a projection of potential
CO 2 emissions from affected sources in their state if the sources were complying
with the rate-based proposal. 20 1 Under the mass-based compliance approach, no
crediting for renewable energy, energy efficiency, or nuclear was necessary under
the basic framework. All things being equal, increasing renewable energy
generation or reducing energy demand through energy efficiency would diminish
associated energy use, reducing emissions from the stationary sources in the
state.
A third major option for compliance in the final rule was the state measures
plan. The state measures plan allowed states to demonstrate that some combination of state policies-such as renewable portfolio standards, energy efficiency
standards, or an economy-wide cap-and-trade program-was projected to achieve
the required emission reductions on a mass basis. 20 2 Since these state-based
programs would not constitute federally enforceable performance standards,
these plans would need to include a federally enforceable backstop. The backstop

196. Id. at 64,667.
197. Id. at 64,707.
198. Id. at 64,833.
199. Id. at 64,834. In keeping with Building Block 2 of the BSER, combined-cycle natural gas power plants
also would generate a fraction of a credit that could only be used by coal-, oil-, or gas-fired steam power plants.
These credits were called gas-shift emission rate credits.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 64,822 24.
202. Id. at 64,835.
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could be either an emission budget or an emission intensity standard for the
covered sources.20 3 In addition to these three main compliance plan archetypes,
states may choose to implement variations of these plans.20 4
Importantly, the EPA responded to requests for additional specificity by
proposing model rules for two of these approaches, an emission intensity plan
and an emission budget plan, at the same time as it issued the final Clean Power
Plan.20 5 These models include regulatory text that, once finalized by EPA, can be
promulgated by states as a presumptively approvable plan. Model regulatory text
greatly simplifies plan development for states, and in the past states have often
submitted plans based on model rules because of the administrative simplicity of
doing so. In many cases, states promulgate regulations that simply reference the
part of code of federal regulations containing the model regulatory text (i.e.,
"incorporation by reference").
The final rule also responded to widespread requests to provide states with
more time for compliance. State plans were due approximately thirteen months
after release of the final rule, however the EPA provided all states with the option
of extending the deadline two additional years.20 6 In order to receive the
extension, the EPA requires that states demonstrate that they are working
toward a compliance plan by providing documentation of engagement with
stakeholders and meaningful consideration of compliance approaches.20 7 In
public documents and statements, the EPA emphasized that this20initial
submittal
8
lift."
"heavy
a
not
and
requirement
modest
a
be
to
intended
was

203. Id. at 64,836 37.
204. For example, states could choose to set custom performance rates or establish individual emission
budgets for each affected unit. Clean Power Plan Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,835 37. EPA also published
a helpful graphical representation of six potential compliance pathways. EPA, State Plan Decision Tree
(2015), https://web.archive.org/web/20 17041 8050759/https://www.epa.gov/cleanpowerplantoolbox/stateplan-decision-tree.
205. Federal Plan Requirements for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Electric Utility Generating Units
Constructed on or Before January 8, 2014; Model Trading Rules; Amendments to Framework Regulations, 80
Fed. Reg. 64,966 (proposed Oct. 23, 2015) [hereinafter Proposed Federal Plan and Model Trading Rules].
206. State plans were originally due on September 6, 2016, and the two-year extension ran until September
6, 2018; however, the Supreme Court's stay of the rule has suspended this timing. See Clean Power Plan Final
Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,855. The thirteen-month original timeline was already an extension of the historic
timeline for state plan development. EPA's general Section 111 (d) implementing regulations call for state plans
to be submitted nine months after the emission guidelines are promulgated. 40 C.F.R. § 60.23(a)(2).
207. All states are eligible to be granted a two year extension if they make an initial submittal that: (1)
identifies state plan approaches under consideration, (2) explains why an extension is required, and (3)
demonstrates opportunity for public comment on the initial submittal and meaningful engagement with
stakeholders, including vulnerable communities. Clean Power Plan Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,856.
208. Memorandum from Stephen D. Page, Director, Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, EPA, to
Regional Air Directors, Oct. 22,2015, https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-04/documents/cpp-initialsubm-memo.pdf (describing the extension request as a "simple" process and the initial submittal as a "modest
requirement"); Robert Walton, EPA Signals Clean Power Plan Extensions Won't be Hard to Attain, UTIITY
DIVE (Oct. 26, 2015), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/epa-signals-clean-power-plan-extensions-wont-be-hardto-attain/407977/ (quoting EPA Acting Assistant Administrator Janet McCabe as saying that receiving an
extension is "not intended to be a heavy lift").
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Offering multiple model rules was a departure from the EPA's prior practice.
Under Section 111 (d), and in most other relevant CAA programs, the EPA has
only provided a single regulatory model, and that model often also serves as the
federal plan. In these contexts, even when states can choose different compliance
approaches, one approach is often the simplest one to implement.
In contrast, with the Clean Power Plan there is no "default" option, reflecting
the consistent requests from states for multiple options. The dual model rules
make both the rate-based and mass-based approach equally viable from an
administrative perspective. Even within the model rules, states have options for
how to customize the approaches-for example, states can choose whether to
include crediting for energy efficiency projects under a rate-based approach, and
they can choose how to allocate allowances under the mass-based rule. The EPA
also did not determine which model rule would serve as the federal plan to be
imposed on states that did not submit an approvable plan. In the proposal the EPA
said that it would finalize one or both rules as the federal plan but took comment
on which plan it should be.2 °9
As a consequence, a threshold choice for states is not only whether a state
should implement one of the model plans, but if so, which one. Not only are these
approaches very different in how they operate, they may also have very different
effects on regulated entities and consumers. This structure gives states an
incentive to engage in planning to understand which approach will better suit
their state given their preferred policy outcomes. In addition, states are also able
to take additional time to develop their compliance plan-a nearly universal
request in state comments-but need to demonstrate in at least a basic way that
they are substantively engaging with compliance considerations to receive such
an extension.
3. State Engagement Over Plan Types
The final rule provided substantial, real choices to states, and the majority of
states responded by substantively considering how they would develop a state
plan. For most state environmental agencies, this included holding stakeholder
meetings, conducting quantitative analyses, engaging with their sister energy
agencies, and participating in multi-state meetings to explore compliance options. Power companies also largely urged states to develop their own plans
instead of waiting for a federal plan.
The two options provided by the model rules the-the rate-based plan and
mass-based plan-function very differently. In general, the rate-based plan is
administratively more complex because it requires the establishment of a mechanism to evaluate and credit avoided GHG emissions from energy efficiency and

209. Proposed Federal Plan and Model Trading Rules, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,966, 64,968 (Oct. 23, 2015).
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renewable energy. At the same time, the rate-based plan may be preferred by
states or power companies that are already planning significant new additions of
renewable energy capacity or new nuclear power plants, because these generation
resources will earn credits that can be used for compliance and turned into
revenue. In contrast, the mass-based plan does not require a crediting mechanism
and is therefore simpler in structure. It can be particularly attractive to states
anticipating retirements or curtailment of older coal-fired power plants, since
such actions would cut absolute emissions and facilitate compliance. The
mass-based plan does require states to make some difficult decisions in implementation, including how to distribute allowances and how to prevent shifting of
generation to new power plants that would not be otherwise covered by the plan.
Although such generalizations can be made about the two model rule plan
types-as well as other compliance options not represented in the model
rules-the on-the-ground outcomes can vary dramatically in different states.
Depending on the state and implementation scenario, an emission-budget plan or
emissions-intensity plan could result in very different compliance costs, impacts
on electricity rates, changes in electricity generation resources, and reductions in
pollution. Given the different outcomes that could result, states had a strong
incentive to understand the different implementation options.
An important factor is that states and companies did not know with certainty
what the federal plan would be, as the EPA only proposed that it would finalize
one of the two proposed models. 210 Had the EPA proposed a specific federal plan,
states could have sat out the planning process and taken the federal plan as the
default.
Power companies also had a lot at stake in terms of what type of plan a state
chose to implement. Companies had an interest in seeing a state adopt a
compliance plan that would allow them to comply under the most profitable
scenario. Depending on a company's existing generation fleet, long-term energy
contracts, and planned investments, this could be either a rate-based or a
mass-based plan. Even power companies that were opposed to the rule encouraged state regulators to engage in assessing compliance options.2 11

210. Proposed Federal Plan and Model Trading Rules, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,966, 64,970 (Oct. 23, 2015) ("the
EPA does not intend to finalize and implement the federal plan for any states prior to the agency's action of
determining a failure to submit a state plan or disapproving a state plan ....The EPA currently intends to
finalize a single approach i.e., either a rate-based or a mass-based approach in all promulgated federal plans
for particular states[.]").
211. See, e.g., David Gutman, Tomblin Will Submit Clean Power Plan Blueprint for WV, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE-MAIL (Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.wvgazettemail.com/article/20151027/GZ01/151029571/200406169
(reporting that Charles Patton, president of Appalachian Power, "lauded the decision to develop a plan for West
Virginia" and quoting him as saying "[iut's really important that, I think, we really take a look at this and not just
say no ....That we look and see if there is any opportunity for us to figure out something that works for West
Virginia."); Elizabeth Harball & Edward Klump, Okla., Texas Show Signs of Veering from 'Just Say No'
Approach, ENERGYWIRE (Oct. 27, 2015), https://www.eenews.netenergywire/stories/1060026963 (quoting
Oklahoma Secretary of Energy and Environment Michael Teague as saying "I will tell you that every one of the
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In March 2015, in anticipation of the promulgation of EPA's final rule, Senate
Majority Leader Mitch McConnell wrote a letter to state governors urging them
not to develop a plan, but rather to wait until the courts had ruled on the merits of
what McConnell called an overreach of the EPA's authority. 212 Despite the
opposition to the Clean Power Plan from a significant number of states and power
companies, McConnell's "just say no" strategy was far from successful. 2 13 As
West Virginia Governor Earl Ray Tomblin-not a supporter of the Clean Power
Plan-explained, "I'dprefer to have a plan in place when the time comes. If [the
EPA doesn't] agree with it then we'll at least have a starting point where we can
talk.",2 14 In the end, only five states had governors who publicly announced that
they would not develop a plan-Texas, Indiana, Wisconsin, Louisiana, and
Oklahoma.2 15
Instead, most states, even those involved in litigation over the Clean Power
Plan, began in-depth evaluation of compliance options. Many states began
holding public stakeholder engagement processes to solicit input on state plan
development, including Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Utah, in
addition to those states that were supportive of the Clean Power Plan.2 16 Other
states that were not holding public processes were holding one-on-one meetings

generators, co-ops and public power authorities in Oklahoma have come to us and said, 'Please, God, don't let
us get FIPed,' Teague said, meaning that the state's electric utilities are hoping to avoid a situation where EPA
imposes a federal implementation plan (FIP) on the state an inevitability if Oklahoma doesn't submit an initial
plan in September 2016."); Stephanie Joyce, Utilities Say Collaboration, Creativity Key To Clean Power Plan,
WYOMING PUBLIC MEDIA (Feb. 6, 2015), http://wyomingpublicmedia.org/post/utilities-say-collaborationcreativity-key-clean-power-plan (reporting that while Wyoming Governor Matt Mead called on the EPA to
"scrap the rule," Berkshire Hathaway Energy's chief environmental counsel Cathy Woollums urged the state to
come up with creative solutions to the rule. "'If the state wants to push back against the plan, that's okay, but we
really do have to have a backup plan because if not, we will be caught in a situation where we don't have any
options,' she said. 'And that's the worst of all positions to be in."').
212. Letter from Senator Mitch McConnell to National Governors Association, (Mar. 19, 2015), https://www.
mcconnell.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/newsletters?ID
D57EBA06-0718-4A22- 8F59- 1E610793A2A3;
see also PETER S. GLASER ET AL., FEDERALIST SOCIETY,EPA's SECTION 111 (D) CARBON RULE: WHAT IF STATES
JUST SAID No? (2014), http://www.fed- soc.org/publications/detail/epas- section- 111 d-carbon-rule-what-if- statesjust-said-no.
213. Elizabeth Harball, Most States Suing EPA 'sClimate Rule Are Also Mulling How to Comply, CLIMATEWIRE
(Nov. 9, 2015), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060027684.
214. Gutman, supra note 211.
215. Jean Chemnick, 'Just Say No' Strategy Appears to be Crumbling, E&E NEWS (Oct. 28, 2015),
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060027079. In Louisiana, it was then-Governor Bobby Jindal that announced
Louisiana would not develop a plan. Staff of Governor John Bel Edwards, who succeeded Governor Jindal in
January 2016, stated that they would work to develop a compliance plan. Elizabeth Harball, La. 's Top
Environment Official Says 'Sharpen the Pencil', CLIMATEWIRE (Apr. 13, 2016), https://www.eenews.netU
climatewire/stories/1060035517.
216. See Joint Reply of West Virginia, Oklahoma, North Dakota, and Mississippi DEQ in Support of
Motions for Stay and for Expedited Consideration, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 23, 2015)
(Challengers of the rule compiled a list of state engagement actions as part of their material supporting their
motion to stay.).
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with stakeholders.

17

Many of these stakeholder processes were conducted with

participation of state utility commissioners or state energy offices. In several
cases, utility commissioners jointly hosted the outreach processes. Many states
also conducted their own quantitative analyses as part of these processes, often
with opportunity for public input. This included West Virginia, Arizona, and the
RGGI states.
Almost all states were engaged in regional and national conversations about
compliance, 2 18 reflecting the importantce of interstate energy transactions and
trading markets as discussed in greater detail in section IV.D below. These
dialogues, hosted or staffed by university and non-profit organizations such as the
Georgetown Climate Center,2 19 the Great Plains Institute,220 the Bipartisan
Policy Center, 221 Duke University's Nicholas Institute for Environmental Policy
Solutions, 222 and Colorado State University's Center for a New Energy
Economy, 22 3 were an important opportunity for state environment and energy
regulators to explore regional and multi-state implications of different compliance choices. In all of these multi-state conversations, states engaged with
quantitative analysis of compliance options conducted by these groups or others.
For some states, especially those with existing GHG reduction programs or
strong clean energy goals, these individual or group discussions built upon
217. Id.
218. Emily Holden, Despite Political Rhetoric, 41 States Exploring Clean Power Plan Options,
CLIMATEWIRE (May 18, 2015), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060018680.
219. The Climate Center hosted various national meetings on Clean Power Plan compliance, including six
meetings of a broad group of states, power companies, and NGOs. See, e.g., State, Power Company, and EPA
Officials Discuss Implementation of Clean Power Plan, GEORGETOWN CLIMATE CENTER (Oct. 14, 2015),

http://w ww. georgetownc limate, org/artic l es/state-power-c ompany-and-epa-oftic ial s-disc u ss-implementationof-clean-power-plan.html. The author's previous work at the Climate Center included work to host such
discussions.
220. The Great Plains Institute co-facilitates groups of state regulators in MISO region and the PJM region.
See, e.g., Midcontinent States Regional Workshop: Implementation Options for EPA's Proposed Clean Power
Plan, BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER (June 5, 2015), https://bipartisanpolicy.org/events/midcontinent-states-regionalworkshop-implementation-options-for-epas-proposed-clean-power-plan/ (noting joint hosting of meeting by
Great Plains Institute and Bipartisan Policy Center); Midcontinent Power Sector Collaborative, GREAT PLAINS
INSTITUTE, http://www.betterenergy.org/projects/midwestern-power-sector-collaborative (last visited May 15,
2017) (collaborative that brings together power companies, environmental organizations and state environmental and utility regulators to consider an optimal approach to reduce carbon emissions from existing power plants
and meet Clean Power Plan requirements).
221. The Bipartisan Policy Center co-facilitates groups of state regulators in the MISO region and the PJM
region. See, e.g., Midcontinent States Regional Workshop: Implementation Options for EPA's Proposed Clean
PowerPlan, BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER (June 5, 2015), https://bipartisanpolicy.org/events/midcontinent-statesregional-workshop-implementation-options-for-epas-proposed-clean-power-plan.
222. The Nicholas Institute hosts meetings of southeastern state regulators and co-facilitated meetings of
states in the PJM region. See, e.g., Jeffrey Tomich, PJM State Officials Discuss Possible Carbon Rule
Coordination, ENERGYWIRE (Oct. 13, 2015), http://www.eenews.nedstories/1060026205 (describing meeting
co-hosted by Duke Nicholas Institute).
223. The Center for a New Energy Economy hosts the Western States Clean Power Plan Initiative. Western
States Clean Power Plan Evaluation Model, WESTERN STATES CLEAN POWER PLAN INITIATIVE, CENTER FOR A
NEW ENERGY ECONOMY (Jan. 20, 2016), http://www.westernstate 1ldplans.com/.
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previous conversations about how states could reduce GHG emissions from the
power sector and expand clean energy generation. 2z In other states, however,
these conversations were taking place for the first time or were taking place at a
level of increased sophistication. In many cases, state regulators were for the first
time seriously considering the potential for reducing reliance on coal-fired
generation and significant expansion of renewable energy generation and energy
efficiency expansion.
An important component of this state planning was that many state regulators
gained a better understanding of how trading or market components worked
under the emission rate and mass-based budget approaches. As previously
described in section III.A, the ability to aggregate or trade emission reduction
opportunities is particularly valuable for reducing GHG emissions because these
mechanisms facilitate system-wide shifts to a cleaner energy system in a
cost-effective way.
When the Clean Power Plan was first proposed, there was a perception that a
mass-based approach might be politically disfavored because it was effectively a
cap-and-trade approach, and there was a lingering aversion to cap-and-trade that
resulted after the failure to pass national cap-and-trade legislation in 2010. A
cap-and-trade mechanism had been the center of the Waxman-Markey bill passed
in the House of Representatives, but never passed the Senate.2 25 The bill was
strongly opposed by many Republicans, and much of the opposition was critical
of the cap-and-trade policy design.226
In evaluating the Clean Power Plan models, and through engagement with
regulated entities and other stakeholders, state regulators delved into the details
of what would be necessary to implement the two different trading mechanisms,
224. For example, in RGGI states, the conversation about how to comply with the Clean Power Plan became
part of a previously planned "program review" that considered whether and how to extend the program beyond
2020. See REG'L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, KEY ITEMS FOR 2016 PROGRAM REVIEW STAKEHOLDER DiscusSIONS: PROGRAM ELEMENTS AND EPA CLEAN POWER PLAN (CPP) (2015), http://www.rggi.org/docs/Program
Review/2016/11-17-15/KeyDiscussion

Items 11

17_15.pdf (identifying how to comply with the Clean

Power Plan as a major element of the 2016 RGGI program review). In addition to already having extensively
considered how to reduce carbon emissions from the power sector, the RGGI states, California, and other states
like Colorado engaged both environment and energy regulators in these conversations. See, e.g., Board of
Directors, RGGI, INC., https://www.rggi.org/rggi/board (last visited May 15, 2017). (The board of directors of
the non-profit that administers RGGI is made up of energy and environment agency heads from each
participating state); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38561(a) (West 2017) (requiring California Air Resources
Board to consult with California Public Utilities Commission on all elements of carbon-reduction plan that
relate to energy); COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-3.2-204 (2017) (requiring that the Colorado Public Utility Commission
provide an opportunity for the Department of Public Health and Environment to review and comment on
mandated utility plans to reduce emissions from existing coal plants).
225. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (ACES), H.R. 2454, 111 th Cong. (2009).
226. See John M. Broder, 'Cap and Trade'Loses Its Standing as Energy Policy of Choice, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
25, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/26/science/earth/26climate.html (reporting that after demise of
Waxman-Markey, the concept of cap and trade "is in wide disrepute, with opponents effectively branding it 'cap
and tax'). As reported in the New York Times article, the idea of cap and trade "began as a middle-of-the-road
Republican plan to unleash the market to reduce power plant pollution and spur innovation." Id.
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how the market-mechanisms could substantially lower compliance costs and
provide other benefits, and what might be some of the resulting market dynamics
in both rate-based and mass-based compliance scenarios. In many, but not all
states, regulators were coming to prefer the mass-based compliance approach.2 27
A key reason for the preference was that a mass-based approach could be easier to
implement, as it did not require the development of rate-based crediting mechanisms. In addition, a number of analyses also showed that mass-based compliance could be cheaper than rate-based compliance, especially when implemented
by a large group of states that traded with each other.228 One consequence of this
intense consideration of compliance approaches was that state regulators
gained-or in some cases regained-an appreciation of the cost-effectiveness
and administrative benefits of a cap and trade-like approach.
Much of the analysis that was being conducted showed that compliance with
the Clean Power Plan could be achieved at relatively low costs in most scenarios.
This became even more true after Congress passed a five-year extension of
renewable energy tax credits in December 2015.229 These tax credits were
projected to significantly increase the development of renewable energy resources before the beginning of the interim compliance period in 2022, reducing
the additional reductions that would be needed to comply with the policy. 230 In
fact, several analyses were showing that compliance costs on a national basis
would be near or at zero during the beginning of the program-that is, market
forces would drive emission reductions below minimum required levels on a

227. See, e.g., Jeffrey Tomich, State Regulators, Utilities See Advantages in Mass-Based Approach to EPA
Rule, ENERGYWIRE (Oct. 20, 2015), http://www.eenews.nedstories/1060026570; Robert Walton, States Leaning
Toward Mass-Based CPP Compliance, Regional Cooperation, UTIITY DIVE (Oct. 21, 2015), http://www.
utilitydive.com/news/states-leaning-toward-mass-based-cpp-compliance-regional-cooperation/407691/; Elizabeth Harball & Emily Holden, Carbon Trading Finds a Foothold in at Least 20 States, CLIMATEWIRE (Jan. 19,
2016), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060030764.
228. See, e.g., Jennifer Macedonia et al., Modeling the Evolving Power Sector and Impacts of the Final
Clean Power Plan, BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER (2016), https://bipartisanpolicy.org/library/clean-power-plananalysis/ ("While individual state results vary, broad adoption of mass-based trading is expected to result in
lower cost and, if new units are covered, lower cumulative CO 2 emissions, than broad adoption of rate-based
trading."); Ross ET AL., supra note 130 (finding that a mass-based approach, especially with multistate
cooperation, offers large cost savings opportunities).
229. Congress passed a package of the tax credit extensions as part of an omnibus spending bill.
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, H.R. 2029, 114th Cong. (2015). The act included provisions
extending the Production Tax Credit for wind energy and Investment Tax Credit for solar energy by five years
past their scheduled expiration dates, while also ramping down the value of the credits over the five-year
period. See Daniel Cusick, Experts Predict Renewable Investment Boom as Congress Renews Tax Credits,
CLIMATEWIRE (Dec. 21, 2015), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060029809.
230. See, e.g., John Larsen & Whitney Herndon, Renewable Tax Extenders: The Bridge to the Clean Power
Plan, RHODIUM GROUP (2016), http://rhg.com/notes/renewable-tax-extenders-the-bridge-to-the-clean-powerplan (finding that "Before the tax extenders utility-scale wind and solar faced a bleak future with combined
capacity additions dropping below 5 gigawatts (GW)
per year until the CPP kicks into gear in 2022. The
combination of the extenders and the CPP now has the industry positioned for growth well into the next decade
with annual capacity additions topping out at an unprecedented 30 GWs in 2021.").
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nation-wide basis, assuming states cooperated and traded with each other.231
To summarize, the EPA responded to state requests by providing multiple,
concrete compliance options. States had strong incentives to engage with these
compliance options, because they could have substantially different impacts on
companies and consumers on a state-by-state basis-and therefore stakeholders
as well as state policy makers pushed for thorough engagement. Most stateseven those opposed to the regulations-responded to the proposed and final rules
by seeking to understand the compliance options, substantively commenting on
them, and evaluating which compliance option would work best for their states.
State environmental and energy agencies often collaborated on consideration of
compliance approaches, hosted stakeholder processes, and participated in regional and multi-state dialogues. Through these processes, state regulators were
"trying on" different compliance pathways, understanding the different ways that
power companies and other entities could shift generation towards loweremitting fossil fuel sources, increase or procure renewable energy, deploy
additional energy efficiency, use trading mechanisms, or use interstate procurement. As a result, environmental regulators learned about energy markets, and
energy regulators learned about how the strategies available for lowering carbon
pollution could interact with those markets. In many cases, state regulators
learned that the levels of emission reduction that were being required-and that
many states opposed-were in fact achievable at a reasonable cost, and developed definite opinions on which compliance pathways were best for their state.
D.

STATES AND EPA DEVELOP INNOVATIVE SOLUTION TO COORDINATION PROBLEMS

In addition to prompting broad engagement by diverse states, the development
of the Clean Power Plan also led to significant policy innovation. In particular,
among the most notable innovations was the development of "trading ready"
compliance approaches that promise to mitigate some of the "patchwork"
problems highlighted in section III.C.
From the beginning of the development of the Clean Power Plan, the EPA
recognized the potential value and interest in allowing interstate coordination.
For example, in its 2013 white paper soliciting input from states and stakeholders, the EPA asked, "What issues arise from the fact that operation and planning
of the electricity system is often regional, but CAA section 111 (d) calls for state
plans?, 2 32 The EPA also asked whether
the EPA should "facilitate the coordina233
tion of multi-state plan submittals?,
231. See, e.g., VAN AlIEN, supra note 130 (projecting allowance prices of $0 in 2025, and $0 to $6 in 2030);
Macedonia et al., supra note 228, at 5 (finding that "state energy policies, falling natural gas prices, and the
extension of federal tax incentives for renewables mean many states are currently on track to comply with the
Clean Power Plan" and that the plan "is not binding in the early years").
232. EPA 111(d) Regulatory Design Questions, supra note 153, at4 5.

233. Id.

2017]

MAKING THE MOST OF COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM

In early input to the EPA, there was broad support for providing states with an
opportunity to develop multi-state plans from both states and companies. 2 34 The
EPA responded by proposing that states be able to develop multi-state plans. The
proposed rule prominently identified the ability of states to "if they choose, work
with other states on multi-state approaches that reflect the regional structure of

electricity operating systems that exists in most parts235of the country and is critical
to ensuring a reliable supply of affordable energy.,
Under this approach, states would be able to submit a joint plan to the EPA
demonstrating that all of the sources in the participating states would meet an
aggregate mass-based or rate-based limit.236 The EPA also specifically contemplated ways in which states that participated in multiple RTOs could participate
in different multi-state plans that were aligned with those RTO boundaries,
allowing the development
of multi-state compliance territories that reflected
237
these electricity markets.
Although there was broad support for the idea of allowing and facilitating
multi-state compliance, in responding to the EPA's proposal, states and stakeholders soon realized that the development of joint plans would prove to be
difficult. 238 First, it would require an affirmative decision from a state's political
leadership to collaborate with other states to comply with the rule, potentially
using a "cap-and-trade" program. 239 Given the political opposition of many

234. See, e.g., Clean Power Plan Proposed Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. at 34,847 ("Many stakeholders recommended
that states be allowed to develop multi-state programs. It was frequently noted that such regional approaches
could offer cost-effective carbon pollution solutions."); see also Joint Preproposal Comment from 15
Supporting States, supra note 156.
235. Clean Power Plan Proposed Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. at 34,834.
236. The EPA also took comment on variations on this approach, including an approach where states
choosing to participate in a multi-state approach submitted individual plans that were "materially consistent for
all common plan elements." Clean Power Plan Proposed Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. at 34,911.
237. Clean Power Plan Proposed Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. at 34,910.
238. See Western States' 111(d) Comments on the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Proposed
Rule: Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units
(Oct. 30, 2014), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602-21787 (Requesting the
EPA allow for a range of planning options, including those that support flexible, multistate compliance options
without necessarily requiring states to enter into a single regional plan); Midcontinent States Environmental and
Energy Regulators' Comments the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Proposed Rule: Carbon Pollution
Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units (Nov. 21, 2014),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602-22535 (Requesting that the "EPA should
recognize that multi-state collaboration can take numerous forms and allow states to file separate state
compliance plans that include or contemplate a connection to other states. For example, two states could
implement separate programs that are connected only by the mutual acceptance of each other's emissions
reductions.").
239. EPA proposed that "only one multi-state plan would be submitted on behalf of all participating states.
The joint submittal would be signed by authorized officials for each of the states participating in the multi-state
plan and would have the same legal effect as an individual submittal for each participating state." EPA did also
take comment on two alternative options, including an option where each state would submit its own plan but
where all of the individual state plans were "materially consistent for all common plan elements." Clean Power
Plan Proposed Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. at 34,911.

THE GEORGETOWN ENVTL. LAW REVIW

[Vol. 29:301

Republican governors to the Clean Power Plan as a whole-and the continued
popular opposition to "cap-and-trade" programs in large parts of the countrythis was recognized as a significant barrier. Affirmative collaboration by states
could be portrayed by political opponents as support for the Clean Power Plan.
Second, requiring states to affirmatively choose to work together would create an
incentive for holding out and other strategic behavior. States with less to gain
from joining a multi-state group-for example larger states with an abundance of
mitigation opportunities-might ask for concessions for joining. Third, requiring
a joint plan would create a significant barrier to having states enter or exit a
trading group.240 Some states might choose to go it alone in their initial
compliance plan, but seek to join a trading group at a later date if it became clear
that joining the group would provide benefits. The joint plan requirement would
make such behavior administratively difficult.2" l Finally, although the EPA
proposed to make available a two-year extension for states working together to
develop compliance plans, some states were concerned that they might not be
able to reach a decision on whether to participate in a joint plan-and therefore
qualify for the extension-in the first year.24 2
In response to these concerns, and through independent national and regional
dialogues and the work of think tanks, 3 many states and stakeholders converged
around a solution that would remove these political and transactional barriersthe "trading ready" approach. 2 4 Under this approach, the EPA would finalize a

240. Under EPA's joint plan proposal, the entire group would likely need to submit a revised plan to EPA that
either included the new entrant or omitted the state exiting the plan. See Clean Power Plan Proposed Rule, 79
Fed. Reg. at 34,917 (discussion of requirements for revising state plan).
241. Midcontinent States Environmental and Energy Regulators' Comments the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) Proposed Rule: Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units 2 (Nov. 21, 2014), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OAR-20130602-22535 ("EPA and states will need to allow for the entrance and exit of potential collaborating states from
multi-state coordination, depending on the outcomes of subsequent individual state decisions.").
242. "Each state will need to follow its own established political, legal and regulatory process for making
compliance decisions. EPA's timeline for multi-state coordination does not currently allow for differing
decision-making processes across states. Due to the complex nature of multi-state coordination, EPA must
provide more time than the one year allotted under the proposed rule for states to reach agreement to pursue a
multi-state approach." Id. at 2.
243. See, e.g., LISSA LYNCH ET AL., GEORGETOWN CLIMATE CENTER, SINGLE STATE CLEAN POWER PLAN
COMPLIANCE APPROACHES WITH INTERSTATE ELEMENTS (2015), http://www.georgetownclimate.org/reports/single-

state-clean-power-plan-compliance-approaches-with-interstate-elements.html;

JONAS MONAST ET AL., DUKE

NICHOLAS INST. FOR ENVTL. POLY SOLUTIONS, ENHANCING COMPLIANCE FLEXIBILITY UNDER THE CLEAN POWER
PLAN: A COMMON ELEMENTS APPROACH TO CAPTURING LOW-COST EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS (2015), https://

nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/climate/publications/enhancing-compliance-flexibility-under-clean-powerplan-common-elements-approach; IMPLEMENTATION ELEMENTS FOR A TRADING-READY MASS-BASED PLAN,
GREAT PLAINS INSTITUTEAND THE BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER (2015), https://cdn.bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-contenU

uploads/2015/05fMass-Trading.pdf.
244. See, e.g., Western States' 111(d) Comments and Midcontinent State Environmental and Energy
Regulators' Comments, supra note 223; see also Emily Holden et al., Behind the Scenes, Most States are
Exploring the Benefits of Carbon Trading, CLIMATEWIRE (Oct. 13, 2015), https://www.eenews.net/stories/10600
26225.
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model rule designed so that states could opt into a multi-state approach. If they
used the EPA's model rule, states could allow firms complying with their state
program to use allowances or emission rate credits from other states using the
same model rule. States would not have to affirmatively identify trading partners
and develop a joint plan with those partners. Instead, they would simply have to
choose between one of two EPA model rules-the least affirmative action a state
could take-and elect to accept allowances or credits from other states, a choice
that firms would likely support.
The EPA adopted this trading-ready approach in the final rule, writing that "in
response to comments from many states and other stakeholders, the guidelines
provide that states may design their programs so that they are "'ready for
interstate trading,' that is, that they contain features necessary and suitable for
their affected EGUs to engage in trading with affected EGUs in other 'trading
ready' states without the need for formal arrangements between individual
states., 245 Both 6of the model rules were also developed so that they would be
24
trading ready.
This trading-ready solution has the potential to remedy some of the most
important limitations of the cooperative federalism framework created by Section
111(d). This policy innovation reduces transaction costs and political barriers to
interstate coordination, making it more likely that compliance under Section
111 (d) will result in a larger trading market and will therefore reduce compliance
costs and administrative costs for firms. The trading-ready approach doesn't
solve all of the limitations related to the state-by-state nature of Section 111(d).
States can still choose between rate-based and mass-based programs, and not all
states are likely to choose the same approach, meaning that some degree of a
regulatory "patchwork" is still likely. But the trading ready approach was a policy
innovation that arose from the iteration and engagement of the rulemaking
process. States requested flexibility, including the flexibility to use multi-state
approaches. Through substantive engagement with the policy options, and
consideration of administrative and political feasibility, many states supported
having the option of a trading-ready approach. EPA listened, and the result was a
framework that seems promising for greatly streamlining interstate cooperation
and significantly mitigating one of the limitations of Section 111(d) when it
comes to regulating GHG emissions from power plants.
E.

EPA OFFERS OPTIONS ON HOW TO INTEGRATE ENERGY PLANNING

A second important policy development was the way in which the EPA
developed varying compliance tools to accommodate states' existing energy
245. Clean Power Plan Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg at 64,827.
246. Proposed Federal Plan and Model Trading Rules, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,966, 64,976 (proposed Oct. 23, 2015)
("The EPA is proposing the federal plans as ready-for-interstate-trading plans. State plans that adopt the model
rule are also considered ready-for-interstate-trading.").
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programs, based in large part on state input. As described above, states broadly
asked the EPA for ways to integrate existing energy policies as mechanisms for
compliance, especially renewable energy, renewable portfolio standards, energy
efficiency, integrated resource planning, combined heat and power, and biomass.
Not all states were pleased with the way that the EPA addressed state requests
for flexibility. Many states that opposed the rule requested that the EPA give
states free rein to decide the levels of emission reduction to be achieved and
the methods of compliance to be used, notwithstanding EPA's obligation to
ensure that state plans meet minimum limits of environmental protectiveness.
These states argued that because of the level of air pollution limitation that was
required, the final Clean Power Plan was an illegal incursion into state energy
jurisdiction, as described in Part V below.
Yet the EPA's final Clean Power Plan incorporated a number of compliance
elements explicitly designed to give states the option of using or aligning their
existing energy policies with their Section 111(d) compliance plan. These
elements were largely based on input from states, including from state energy
regulators. Although not satisfying to all states, these mechanisms allow states to
use their preferred energy policies to help achieve the air pollution goals required
by the Clean Power Plan. This section highlights four such compliance elements.
1. Crediting for Renewables, Efficiency in Rate-Based Plans
As discussed in section IV.B, states and many other stakeholders broadly
requested the option of crediting renewable energy and energy efficiency in state
compliance programs. In a mass-based program, emission reductions occurring
because of shifts to renewable energy or because of efficiency efforts are captured
by default, as generation from emitting power plants is curtailed and emissions
decrease on an absolute basis. In an emission intensity program, however, an
explicit crediting mechanism is required.
EPA developed a rate-based crediting system through significant engagement
with states and stakeholders in a way that allows, but does not require, states to
continue to use a variety of existing renewable and energy efficiency tools
already deployed by states. For example, EPA developed rules for interstate
trading of emission rate credits that were explicitly intended to mirror the existing
renewable electricity credit mechanisms used by states that allow power companies to acquire renewable
energy from other states for the purposes of complying
24 7
with state RPSs.

247. Clean Power Plan Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,735, 64,908 (supporting trading as an element of
BSER based on the fact that "many states have adopted RE standards that promote RE through the trading of
renewable energy certificates (RECs)" and recognizing that "ERC may be issued based on the same data and
verification requirements used by existing REC ...tracking systems"); Clean Power Plan Proposed Rule, 79
Fed. Reg. 34,830, 34,922 (noting that proposed approach to RE crediting mirrors the way that RECs "allow for
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EPA also allowed states to credit in-state entities directly for renewable energy
that they acquired through direct investment or contracting in other states.24"
Again, this mirrors the energy decisions that some states and utilities are already
using to increase renewable energy and take advantage of cheaper renewables in
other states. For example, the Tennessee Valley Authority has used long-term
power purchase agreements to significantly increase renewable energy as a
component of its generation mix, as have other southeastern generators in states
249
without RPSs.
At the request of states and stakeholders, EPA also allows states to use
demand-side energy efficiency as a compliance measure in the crediting system,
even though it is not an element of the BSER. States may issue emission rate
credits to energy efficiency programs, including new projects being administered
or funded under existing state energy efficiency programs.2 5 0 EPA's proposed
model rule, which states may adopt, explicitly includes demand-side efficiency
projects as an eligible resource, citing strong state and stakeholder interest in
having efficiency projects credited. 1
2. Set-Asides in Mass-Based Plans
Implementation under the mass-based program is appealing in large part
because states would not need to develop the kind of complicated crediting
program as detailed in the rate-based program above. Many states adopting
mass-based plans may choose to simply continue or expand state energy
efficiency programs outside of the Clean Power Plan compliance framework.
At the same, time, there may be reasons that a state would seek to promote
efficiency through a state Clean Power Plan program, and EPA again accommodates these potential uses. For example, states may auction allowances and invest
the proceeds into energy efficiency programs,25 2 which is the model used by

interstate trading of RE attributes and the fact that a given state's RPS requirements often allow for the use of
qualifying RE located in another state to be used to comply with that state's RPS").
248. Clean Power Plan Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,898 (describing how states using a rate-based
compliance plan can take credit for renewable energy procured through a power purchase agreement in a
mass-based state or across international borders).
249. See, e.g., Herman K. Trabish, TVA to Sign Major Solar Deal with NextEra for 80 MW, UTILITY DIVE
(Feb. 13, 2015), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/tva-to-sign-major-solar-deal-with-nextera-for-8g0-mw/364537/
(noting also previous TVA power purchase agreements and agreements by Gulf Power, Georgia Power, and
Alabama Power).
250. Proposed Federal Plan and Model Trading Rules, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,901.
251. Proposed Federal Plan and Model Trading Rules, 80 Fed. Reg at 65,002. EPA takes comment on
whether to include demand-side efficiency projects as eligible resources in a federal plan. 80 Fed. Reg. at
64,994.
252. Proposed Federal Plan and Model Trading Rules, 80 Fed. Reg. at 65,015 ("The EPA believes that states
should have the opportunity to make decisions about allowance distribution and that they may have additional
flexibility on approaches, including allowance auctions.").
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Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative. 3 EPA also allows states to distribute
allowances directly to entities that will provide renewable energy and energy
efficiency services through a set-aside. 4
3. State Measures Approach
As discussed previously in section IV.C, EPA also allows state to submit a plan
that focuses entirely on state measures in the first instance. For example, a state
could rely on RPS and EERS policies that were projected to significantly reduce
GHG emissions from the power sector, as long it also established a federallyenforceable regulatory backstop that would kick in should the required reductions not materialize. A major reason for developing this option was to provide a
pathway for the state of California to use its portfolio of existing programsincluding an economy-wide cap and trade program and ambitious RPS-as a
basis for Clean Power Plan compliance. The state measures approach was also
a way that states could use Integrated Resource Plans ("IRPs") as the basis for a
CPP plan. Most states require electric utilities to submit plans that forecast future
electricity demand, and plan for how they will meet that demand through a
mixture of supply side and demand side resources.25 6 The state measures
approach is one way that states could chose to use the IRP process to meet CPP
requirements.
4. The Reliability Provision and Energy Planning
EPA's statutory requirement to take into account "energy requirements" was
translated into a requirement that "each state demonstrate as part of its final state
plan submission that it has considered reliability issues while developing its plan
in order to ensure that standards of performance can be implemented and
enforced as required by the CAA. '257

The reliability demonstration was included after a number of comments
requested that states be required to coordinate with RTOs.25 8 Although no details
are provided on what would be required for a satisfactory demonstration, EPA
253. See Why Energy Efficiency?, REG'L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, https://www.rggi.org/rggi-benefits/
why-efficiency (last visited Apr. 2, 2017).
254. Proposed Federal Plan and Model Trading Rules, 80 Fed. Reg. at 65,015 16.
255. Clean Power Plan Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,836 (noting that state measures plan could
accommodate "the programs implemented by California"). California was the first state to develop a proposed
compliance plan, and it proposed to use the state measures approach. CAL. AIR RES. BD., CALIFORNIA'S
PROPOSED COMPLIANCE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL CLEAN POWER PLAN 1 (2016), https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/

powerplants/meetings/09222016/proposedplan.pdf.
256. In 2013, 27 states had IRP requirements, 10 states had long term plan requirements, and two states were
developing an IRP rule. RACHEL WILSON & BRUCE BIEWALD, REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, BEST PRACTICES
IN ELECTRIC UTILITY INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLANNING 5 (2013).

257. Clean Power Plan Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,876 77.
258. Id. at 64,877.
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notes that ISOs and RTOs and other commenters "pointed out that planning and
anticipation of change are among the essential ingredients of ensuring the
ongoing reliability of the electricity system." EPA recommends that agencies
have plans reviewed by ISOs/RTOs and develop plans in consultation with utility
commissions. 259
In sum, the EPA worked within its limited authority to find ways for states to
voluntarily be able to incorporate their own energy policies and priorities in
multiple compliance pathways offered by the Clean Power Plan. As part of its
responsibility to consider energy impacts, it also promoted state engagement with
state utility regulators, but did not place any substantive requirements on what
that engagement would look like (beyond that the state had considered reliability
issues).
E BENEFITS AND LIMITS OF ENGAGEMENT

The EPA's development of the Clean Power Plan under the cooperative
federalism framework of Section 111(d) was successful in prompting a surprisingly broad and holistic policy response by state regulators-even those opposed
to the rule.
This engagement prompted intensive learning by state regulators about how
they could reduce GHG emissions in the power sector by using different
regulatory pathways. In many instances, regulators recognized that significant
reductions could be achieved at modest costs to their states, especially with
availability of trading and crediting mechanisms. It also led to extensive interagency coordination between environment and energy regulators, previously a
rare occurrence. Finally, it prompted discussions in different energy regions
across the country about how GHG reductions could integrate with regional
energy governance structures.
In response to state and stakeholder comments and informed by the work of
think tanks, the EPA developed the trading-ready approach, which has the
potential to facilitate interstate coordination and mitigate one of the chief
limitations of Section 111(d). The EPA also developed compliance tools to
accommodate states' preferred existing energy policies, if states want to use or
build on such policies to help achieve required carbon pollution reduction goals.
GHGs are a global pollutant, and the electricity system in the United States is
an interstate system. Uniform national regulations could no doubt more efficiently address GHG emissions from power plants than state-by-state regulation
under Section 111 (d). Yet Congress is gridlocked with national party politics and

259. Id. at 64,877; see also id. at 64,848 ("The EPA encourages states to include utility regulators (e.g. the
PUCs) and state energy offices as appropriate early on and throughout in the development of the state plan. The
EPA notes that utility regulators and state energy offices have the opportunity during the public participation
processes required for state plans to provide input as well.").
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no such legislation is forthcoming. In contrast, the federalism of the Clean Power
Plan and EPA's extensive outreach incentivized many state regulators-even
those opposed to the regulation-to engage as problem solvers despite the
contentious political environment. Prior scholarship has shown how a dynamic,
iterative federalism can create policy benefits over the course of multiple
regulatory cycles. The experience of the Clean Power Plan demonstrates how,
even within the course of a single rulemaking, dynamic and iterative state-federal
engagement can prompt the same beneficial innovation and learning, and can
potentially do so among a broad group of states, not just those supportive of the
regulatory effort.
V. TENTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGES

The broad policy response by states described in Part IV raises a potential
challenge. If nearly all states are engaging in compliance planning-and many of
these states oppose the EPA's regulations-then is this evidence that states are
being commandeered or coerced into behavior in violation of the Tenth

Amendment?
The United States Constitution limits federal authority to the powers granted
by the Constitution itself,260 and the Supremacy Clause provides that federal laws
made pursuant to that authority are supreme over any state laws. 261 The Tenth
Amendment reserves to the states any powers that are not delegated to the federal
government or prohibited to the states by the Constitution.2 62
One of the powers reserved to the states is the ability to independently
promulgate legislation and to police state laws. Furthermore, as the Supreme
Court held in New York v. United States, "even where Congress has the authority
under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks
the power directly to compel the States to require or prohibit those acts. 263 That
is, under the anti-commandeering doctrine the federal government cannot force
the states to enact laws, or to implement or enforce federal regulatory policies,
even if it has the authority to directly legislate the same outcome through federal
action.
The anti-commandeering doctrine is rooted in the principle of dual sovereignty. In forming the Constitutional federal government, the states surrendered
' 264
many of their powers but retained "a residuary and inviolable sovereignty.

,

260. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (referring to powers "herein granted"); U.S. CONST. amend. X.
261. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the Land").
262. U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.").
263. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992).
264. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918 22 (1997) (quoting The Federalist No. 39 (J. Madison)); see
also discussion of dual sovereignty, infra section ILA; Erwin Chemerinsky, Federalism Not as Limits, But as
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The federal government may use its constitutionally enumerated powers to
directly regulate individuals and businesses,2 65 but may not commandeer state
governments to the same end because this would violate states' sovereignty and
the political accountability of the democratic federal system. 2 66 Although earlier
court cases curtailed federal incursions into state sovereignty, 2 67 anti-

commandeering doctrine takes shape in a series of cases beginning in the late
1970s. The two most important are New York v. United States and Printzv. United

States, the only two cases where the Supreme Court invalidated provisions of
federal statutes on anti-commandeering grounds.268 In New York the Court struck
down a provision of the federal Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 because the law required states to choose between two
impermissible options-either pass legislation to dispose of nuclear waste, or be
obligated to take title to the waste.2 69 In Printz the Court invalidated a provision

of the Brady Act that would have commandeered local law enforcement officers
to screen prospective gun purchasers.270
In its anti-commandeering cases the Supreme Court also affirmed, however,
that the federal government is permitted to encourage state action, including
through cooperative federalism. As the Court put it in New York-relying on an
earlier case, Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n-the federal

Empowerment Federalism in the 21st Century: Theories of Federalism, 45 U. KAN. L. REv. 1219, 1224
(1996).
265. "[T]he Framers explicitly chose a Constitution that confers upon Congress the power to regulate
individuals, not States." New York, 505 U.S. at 166.
266. The chief policy rationale for prohibiting commandeering cited by the Court and traced back to the
Constitutional framers is that it "would threaten the political accountability key to our federal system." If
federal officials can compel state action, the theory is that they could shield themselves from accountability for
those actions that they compelled. Several scholars have challenged the validity of this policy rationale and
historical grounding of this doctrine. See, e.g., Andrew B. Coan, Commandeering, Coercion, and the Deep
Structure of American Federalism, 95 B.U. L. REv. 1 (2015) (developing a detailed constituency-relations
rationale for anti-commandeering and coercion, but finding it ultimately insufficient); Evan H. Caminker, State
Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1001 (1995) (arguing anti-commandeering is unjustified as a matter of constitutional law
because the Court's "formal conception of 'dual sovereignty' relies on "an unpersuasive originalist argument
concerning the Framers' constitutional design"); Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law:
Printz and Principle, 111 HARV. L. REv. 2180 (1997) (arguing anti-commandeering rule articulated in Printz is
not well supported in constitutional history and is both under-inclusive and over-inclusive toward legitimate
goals of protecting state governments and promoting political accountability).
267. See, e.g., Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911) (federal government does not have the power to compel a
state not to move its capital); Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. 71 (1869) (finding that Congress may not interfere
with state's sovereign power of taxation where such power has not been preempted); Texas v. White, 74 U.S.
700 (1869) (finding that through their union in the Constitution, states preserve permanently "separate and
independent autonomy").
268. Coan, supra note 266, at 8 9.
269. The act required that states either take action to dispose of nuclear waste or, after a certain date, would
be required to take title to nuclear waste upon the request of the owner or generator and therefore become liable
for damages. The Court found either action would constitute commandeering of state government, and therefore
the statute provides a choice limited to two impermissible options. New York, 505 U.S. at 153 54, 174 77.
270. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
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government may "offer States the choice of regulating ...activity according to
federal standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation. '271 The
cooperative federalism of the Clean Air Act has been upheld in several
instances on these grounds, including in cases challenging EPA's regulatory
actions under Section 110.272 Courts have also repeatedly recognized the use
of financial inducements under Congress's spending authority as a permissible encouragement. 273
To be permissible, federal encouragements must not turn from "pressure... into compulsion" such that they coerce states into action.27 4 This has
historically been a high bar. Conditions on federal spending are ubiquitous and
rarely successfully challenged.27 5 In 2012, however, the Supreme Court relied on
coercion doctrine to strike down a provision of the Affordable Care Act in
National Federationof Independent Businesses v. Sebelius. 276 The Court found
that the Affordable Care Act effectively gave states no choice but to expand
Medicaid eligibility, because states declining such an expansion would lose all of
their existing Medicaid funding.2 77 The Court distinguished this provision from
permissible funding inducements because the states were threatened with the loss
of an extraordinary sum of funding that they had been relying on-on average
twenty percent of a state's total budget.27 8 In contrast, in South Dakota v. Dole the
Court upheld a federal condition placed on a portion of available federal
transportation funding-approximately five percent of federal highway funding
available, amounting to half of one percent of South Dakota's total budget at the
271. New York, 505 U.S. at 166 69. In Hodel, the court found that a "steep slope" provision of the Surface
Mining & Reclamation Act of 1977 that required mining companies to restore mined land to its approximate
original contour did not violate the Tenth Amendment by forcing relinquishment of state control of land use
planning or through impacts on the state economy, because states had a choice to either submit a regulatory
program or allow direct federal regulation. "The steep-slope provisions of the Surface Mining Act govern only
the activities of coal mine operators ...States are not compelled to enforce the steep-slope standards, to expend
any state funds, or to participate in the federal regulatory program in any manner whatsoever. If a State does not
wish to submit a [state regulatory program], the full regulatory burden will be borne by the Federal Government.
Thus, there can be no suggestion that the Act commandeers the legislative processes of the States by directly
compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program." Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 282 88 (1981).
272. Texas v. EPA, 726 F.3d 180, 196 97 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (dismissing commandeering challenges to a rule
requiring states to either revise SIPs by a deadline or allow temporary federal regulation until the SIP is revised);
Miss. Comm'n on Envtl. Quality v. EPA, 790 F.3d 138, 174 76 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (holding that provisions
allowing EPA to designate areas in "nonattainment" despite a state's objection, and then requiring the state to
submit a plan for that area or be subject to direct federal regulation were not commandeering).
273. New York, 505 U.S. at 166467; see South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). In South Dakota, the
Supreme Court upheld a condition on federal transportation funding that would withhold a portion of federal
transportation funding to states that allowed the purchase of alcohol by those under 21.
274. Nat'l Fed'n. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 577 78 (2012) (quoting Steward Machine Co. v.
Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).
275. See Coan, supra note 266, at 10-13.
276. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 585 86.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 579 84.
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time.27 9
Those challenging the EPA's regulations in court argue that the Clean Power
Plan commandeers and coerces agency action. They contend that EPA's "attempt
to decarbonize the U.S. energy system through section 111 regulation leaves
States no choice but to alter their laws and programs governing electricity
generation and delivery to accord with and carry out federal policy. ' 280 They
further claim that the rule is coercive because it threatens
"to disrupt the electric
281
systems of States that do not carry out federal policy.
Both the anti-commandeering and the coercion claims are difficult to sustain in
light of the Court's repeated affirmation that cooperative federalism is a lawful
way for the federal government to encourage state action. As long as the states
can choose to have the EPA implement a federal regulatory program directly, then
there is no commandeering. The EPA has proposed a federal plan that would do
exactly that-set GHG emission standards on power plant operators. The EPA
does not propose any sanctions, including withholding of funding, if states
choose not to implement the rule.282 States may prefer to implement their own
plan to better align with their policy preferences-and as this Article points out,
there are many compelling reasons to do so-but ultimately it is their choice.
Petitioners go further, however, and argue that in the case of the Clean Power
Plan, even the federal plan would unconstitutionally compel states to engage in
energy planning and permitting. As petitioners put it in their opening brief: "A
federal plan's mandate to retire coal-fired plants or reduce their utilization
(including by requiring the purchase of emissions allowances) would force state
utility and electricity regulators to respond in the same way as if the State itself
had ordered the retirements. 2 83 They similarly argue that states are coerced into
taking such energy planning and regulatory actions because the alternative would
be disruption of electricity service.284
These arguments attempt to shift focus from the question of whether the
federalism regime adequately offers states the choice of direct federal regulation

279. South Dakota, 483 U.S. at 211; see also cases cited supra note 273 and accompanying text.
280. Petitioners Opening Brief on Core Legal Issues at 78, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Feb.
19, 2016). Petitioners also claim EPA lacks a necessary "clear statement" from Congress authorizing a federal
incursion into what has traditionally been an area of traditional state regulation energy. Compare id.at 36-40,
with Brief for State and Municipal Intervenors in Support of Respondents at 8 17, West Virginia v. EPA, No.
15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 22, 2016). Although that claim also raises federalism concerns, it does not turn on
whether the EPA is compelling state action and therefore is not treated here.
281. Petitioners Opening Brief on Core Legal Issues at 84, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Feb.
19, 2016).
282. The final rule's regulatory text explicitly prohibits sanctions. Clean Power Plan Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg.
at 64,942 ("The EPA will not withhold any existing federal funds from a State on account of a State's failure to
submit, implement, or enforce an approvable plan or plan revision, or to meet any other requirements under this
subpart or subpart B of this part.").
283. Petitioners Core Issues Opening Brief at 82, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 19,
2016).
284. Id. at 85.

THE GEORGETOWN ENVTL. LAW REVIW

[Vol. 29:301

to the question of whether the indirect effects of permissible federal regulation
implicate state or local government bureaucracy. No court has found that indirect
effects of otherwise permissible federal regulations amount to unconstitutional
commandeering. Many federal statutes and regulations, including other Clean Air
Act regulations, minimum wage legislation, and the Americans with Disabilities
Act ("ADA"), indirectly affect state or local government actions without illegally
commandeering those jurisdictions.2 85 As D.C. Circuit Judge David Tatel pointed
out in oral argument over the Clean Power Plan, the ADA requires private entities
to accommodate disabled persons by building ramps, installing elevators, and
taking other actions that often require these private entities to seek permits or
zoning changes from state or local governments.2 86 The ADA permissibly
achieves its objective by directly regulating the behavior of these private entities
instead of regulating state or local governments.28 7 If an indirect result of that
regulation is that private entities incorporate ADA compliance actions into their
interactions with other state or local regulatory obligations, then it is not
unconstitutional commandeering.
This result is supported by the Supreme Court's decision in Hodel, where the
Court upheld provisions that required steep slope mining operators to return
mined land to its original contours. Petitioners argued that this provision "forced
relinquishment of state control of land use planning," but the Court found that no
commandeering had taken place because a federal statute commandeers only if it
"regulates the states as states., 288 A federalism scheme that offers states the
option of direct federal regulation of private entities does not amount to
commandeering, even if those federal regulations may result in private entities
changing the ways in which they interact with other state or local laws.
The Clean Power Plan stays within these boundaries, because it offers the
states the choice of either setting standards on power plant operators themselves
or allowing the federal government to do so. If a state declines to submit a
compliance plan, EPA's proposed federal plan would place regulatory obligations
only on power plant operators, not on states. To the extent that power plant
operators would seek to incorporate specific compliance choices into other state
regulatory requirements, these would be indirect effects analogous to incorporating accessibility elements required by the ADA in building permits.

285. See Respondent EPA's Final Brief at 104-05, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 22,
2016).
286. Transcript of Oral Argument at 179 81, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 27, 2016);
see also Respondent EPA's Final Brief at n.94, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 22, 2016)
(petitioners arguments could make ADA unconstitutional); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101, 12182 84 (2017).
287. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182 83 (providing that "no individual shall be discriminated against on the
basis of disability ...by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation" and going on to specify requirements for new construction and alterations).
288. Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 287 88 (1981).
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For example, should the Clean Power Plan result in a utility proposing to build
more solar energy in an update of its integrated resource plan or in a rate
proposal,28 9 the state utility commission's review of that resource plan or
proposal would not have been commandeered by the EPA. The utility commission would have reviewed the plan or proposal-mandated under state laweven if the solar project had not been included, and regardless of which
components of the plan or proposal were motivated by federal air pollution (or
reliability, safety, or any other) requirements. Similarly, if a state environmental
agency conducts siting and permitting review of an energy generation facility
under state law, 290 that is a review that would routinely occur for any new facility,
independent of whether a federal regulation was one of the factors motivating the
new construction. Every air pollution standard that affects the power sector has
this same interaction with state energy policy, and state energy regulators have
adjusted their planning to accommodate compliance with federal air pollution
standards since the Clean Air Act was enacted.
Neither are the states coerced into these regulatory or permitting actions. In the
example above, if a power plant owner proposes to construct new solar facilities
in an integrated resource plan or rate proposal before a state public utility
commission ("PUC"), there is no federal threat that prevents the state government from denying the plan. If the permit or plan is denied, the obligation would
remain on the power plant owner to reduce GHG emissions to meet the federal
requirements. The Clean Power Plan includes no sanction directed at states that
fail to approve permits or plans that indirectly incorporate compliance choices of
power plant owners, much
less the threat of cutting twenty percent of a state's
29 1
budget, as in Sebelius.
Outside of these routine decisions, states are not required to take energyrelated actions under the Clean Power Plan. Air regulators could choose to
implement a permit-based program like the EPA's model rule without any input
from state energy regulators or alignment with energy policy making. As this
Article shows, many states might have chosen to integrate their Clean Power Plan

289. Approximately thirty states require utilities to submit integrated resource plans to Public Utility
Commissions for approval as part of a planning process to ensure the development of reliable and cost effective
electricity generation infrastructure that also meets public policy goals. Twenty states also regulate electricity
under a traditional cost-of-service regulatory model chiefly in the West and Southeast where utilities include
capital investments as part of their rate proposals that must be approved by Public Utility Commissions. See JiM
LAZAR, REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, ELECTRICITY REGULATION IN THE US: A GUIDE 49 52, 108 (2d ed.

2016), http://www.raponline.org/knowledge-center/electricity-regulation-in-the-us-a-guide-2/; William Boyd
& Ann E. Carlson, Accidents ofFederalism:Ratemaking and Policy Innovation in Public Utility Law, 63 UCLA
L. REv. 810, 836-39 (2016).
290. In many states environmental agencies are responsible for such reviews under state law. See LAZAR,
supra note 289, at 39.
291. See Respondent EPA's Final Brief at 103-04, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 22,
2016).
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compliance with their energy policies for their own purposes, but the Clean
Power Plan does not require them to do so.
It is clear the Clean Power Plan is a significant air pollution control regulation,
and that air pollution control in the power sector and energy policy are deeply
intertwined. But Congress has empowered states, not the federal government, to
integrate energy and air pollution considerations if they choose to do so by
creating a federalist framework for both energy and air pollution authorities.
States are the ones granted primacy in energy planning and siting, and states are
the ones that in the first instance can choose how to set GHG pollution standards
to meet federal minimums under Section 111 (d).
Many states have asked the EPA to provide regulatory options and procedures
that facilitate integrated state energy and environment planning. This is only
sensible, and the EPA has obliged. However, it cannot be the case that the EPA is
overreaching in a way that either compels or coerces such state action merely
because the EPA has responded to state requests to facilitate the integration of
energy policy into state responses. Once again, EPA is facilitating a commonbut still voluntary-state response.
CONCLUSION

Given the uncertainty around the Clean Power Plan, it is important to
recognize what has already been accomplished through the rulemaking itself.
The cooperative federalism structure of Section 111(d), when combined with
the EPA's unprecedented outreach, catalyzed a more holistic, interdisciplinary
policy approach than previous rulemakings. This engagement facilitated broad
learning across agencies and levels of government about GHG reduction strategies and the potential for integration with the electricity system. It led to the
development and refinement of multiple compliance options, some of which
are now broadly recognized by state officials-even those hostile to the
regulation-as viable compliance pathways. Through the analysis of multiple
compliance options, many regulators and stakeholders discovered how costeffective and beneficial promoting renewable energy and energy efficiency could
be for their state.
State environmental agencies nearly universally engaged with both utility
commissioners and state energy offices in interagency processes in order to
evaluate compliance options to an unprecedented degree. States in each energy
region participated in regional energy conversations and coordinated with regional transmission organizations, balancing authorities, and other energy system
stakeholders.
The rulemaking process also led to significant policy innovation, most notably
in the development of the trading-ready compliance approach. This policy
innovation radically cuts down on the collective action problem posed by
state-by-state compliance.
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Should the Clean Power Plan move forward, perhaps after a lengthy delay, the
extensive state engagement prompted in the plan development would lead to a
much more robust state implementation. The policy innovations developed
through this cooperative federalism program will solve many-though not
all-of the interstate coordination problems identified above.
But even if implementation of the Clean Power Plan does not move forward,
the broad state policy response resulting from the development of the Clean
Power Plan will inform and promote state actions in support of decarbonization,
even if they are framed in different ways.

